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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in ruling that there is no historical or textual basis for

interpreting the Utah Constitution differently than the federal constitution? Interpretation of
the Utah Constitution is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Snyder v. Murray City
Corp,, 2003 UT 13, % 17, 73 P.3d 325. This issue was preserved in the Jensens' opposition
to the defendants' motions for summary judgment. (R. 1271.)
2.

Did the trial court otherwise err in ruling that the federal court's ruling was

res judicata as to the Jensens' state law claims? Whether res judicata bars an action presents
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Mack v. Utah State Dept ofComm., 2009 UT
47, TJ 26, — P.3d —. This issue was preserved in the Jensens' opposition to the defendants'
motion for summary judgment. (R. 1271.)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 1 - "All men have the inherent and inalienable right to
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to
worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest
against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7 - "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 14 - "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized."
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
On July 18, 2005, the Jensens filed an action asserting violations of the Utah and
United States constitutions, wrongful initiation of process, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (R. 1-70.) The defendants removed the action to federal court based
upon the presence of the federal constitutional claims. (R. 106-108.)
On September 22, 2008, U. S. District Court Judge Ted Stewart granted summary
judgment to all remaining defendants on the federal constitutional claims. (See Add. Exh.
3 (Memorandum Decision); see also R. 117-188.) That ruling is currently on appeal.
The federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Jensens' state law
claims, stating that "as [the Jensens'] Utah constitutional claims present important
questions of state law, the Court declines to further exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims and will remand them to the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which this case was removed." Id,, p. 62.
On remand, the defendants filed motions for summary judgment on varying
grounds. (R. 281, 947, 1012, 1089.) The trial court granted summary judgment to all
defendants on the grounds that the federal court's dismissal of the federal claims was res
judicata as to all of the Jensens' state law claims. (R. 4199; see Addendum Exhs. 1 and
2.) The Jensens timely appealed. (R. 4211.)

2

Statement of Facts1
The record includes the following evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom:
On April 30, 2003, Barbara Jensen of Sandy, Utah, took her son Parker to an oral
surgeon to remove a small growth under Parker's tongue that the family dentist had
diagnosed as a clogged saliva duct ten months earlier. (R. 2332-2334, 3278-79, 3283.)
The oral surgeon also diagnosed the growth as a clogged saliva duct, but sent a
sample to LabCorp for testing per standard procedure. (R. 1711-12, 3275-76.) He
subsequently received a call from a LabCorp doctor who said the sample was malignant,
but he was "not sure of the cell type." (R. 1713-14, 3287.) LabCorp later issued a report
stating a diagnosis of "poorly differentiated small round blue cell tumor." (R. 3285-86.)
That diagnosis could encompass up to 40 different tumor types, for which treatments
vary. (R. 1756, 2688-89, 2737, 2791, 3192.) It is critical to make an accurate diagnosis
of a patient's cancer type, both for treatment and prognosis. (R. 2738, 3199, 3210.)
The oral surgeon told the Jensens about the call, and said he had arranged for them
to see an ear, nose & throat specialist (Dr. Muntz) at Primary Children's Medical Center.
(R. 2334-35, 1715.) Dr. Muntz noted that the tumor type was unknown, writing: "The
unusual presentation and slow growth of this makes me less concerned re:
rhabdomyosarcoma but such tumors as alveolar soft part sarcoma and leiomyosarcoma,
etc are possibilities."

(R. 2335, 3320.)

He referred the Jensens to the oncology

In the federal court, the defendants' statements of fact totalled 194 pages; the Jensens
submitted an additional 139 pages. Accordingly, this summary is significantly truncated.
A full chronology is at R. 1130-1270.
3

department, where they met with defendant Lars Wagner, an assistant professor of
pediatrics at the University of Utah. (R. 2336, 3147-48.) Wagner said he couldn't really
do anything until he had his own facility's pathology report. (R. 2122, 3212-13.)
The pathologist on the case, Dr. Lowichik, began receiving unusually frequent
phone calls from Wagner about Parker's case. (R. 2801-07.) Lowichik was not prepared
to state definitely that the tumor was Ewing's, but she "did [her] best" to put it into a
category. (R. 2793-95.) On May 20, 2003, she wrote that, from her examination, the
results "suggested] a diagnosis of Ewing's Sarcoma." (R. 2793-94,2804, 3352-53.)
A number of factors militated against a finding of Ewing's, including:
•

Only about 1 percent of all cancers are pediatric, of which Ewing's comprises
only 3-5 percent. (R. 3269-70.)

• 80-90 percent of Ewing's patients have primary tumors in the bone, not soft
tissue, and of the latter, most are in the deep soft tissue. (R. 2079-85, 3270.)
Parker's growth was in the superficial soft tissue. (R. 2079-80, 2776, 3112.)
Ewing's in the mouth would be even rarer. (R. 1520-21, 1790-91, 2078-79,
2808, 3259.)
• Ewing's is aggressive and fast-growing; Parker's was slow growing. (R. 1516,
1795, 2706-07, 3062, 3074, 3077.)
Lowichik's May 20 report stated: "DIAGNOSIS: SOFT TISSUE UNDER TONGUE,
BIOPSY; EWING SARCOMA / PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR (SEE

COMMENT)."

(Ewing's is often referred to as Primitive Neuroectodermal Tumor

("PNET") when located in the soft tissue. (R. 1521, 1751-52, 2047-48, 2092-2093.))
The "Comment" said, "In the event of excision of additional lesional tissue from this site,
cytogenetic studies and freezing of tissue for possible molecular ancillary studies may be
informative." (R 3352-53.)
4

The Jensens were informed that Parker had Ewing's Sarcoma.

A "margin"

(removal of remaining malignant tissue with a margin of clean cells) was scheduled, but
later canceled. (R. 2123-24, 2340, 2383-84.) The Jensens were told that chemotherapy
would begin the following Tuesday (R. 2125), and began preparing for the upcoming
ordeal. Barbara's brother moved in from Idaho to tend the other children, and they
planned structural changes to their house. (R. 2125, 2296, 2307-08, 2611-12, 3278-79.)
Wagner said that Parker needed to begin chemotherapy immediately, that "we had
two weeks because it was so aggressive." (R. 2166-67, 2340, 2415-16, 2650-51.) The
Jensens asked if there were any other tests that would help confirm the diagnosis of
Ewing's. Wagner said no. (R. 2150.) That statement was false. Wagner knew that:
•

Cytogenetic and molecular testing, which had not been done, were reliable
diagnostic tests for Ewing's (R. 1501-02, 3360), were routinely performed at
PCMC in cases of suspected Ewing's (R. 1500, 1758-60, 2730-33, 2798, 3167-68,
3208, 3170, 3210-11), and were inexpensive. (R. 1792, 2799.)2

•

The only testing that had been done (immunohistochemical) cannot definitively
diagnose Ewing's, as markers indicative of Ewing's can also manifest with other
things, including healthy tissue. (R. 1752, 2058, 2807, 3203-4, 3153, 3166.)
Immunohistochemical testing also cannot detect an 11;22 translocation. (R. 2060.)
Wagner later testified that he declined to request genetic or molecular testing

because it was not necessary and was not technically required by a Clinical Trial
(AEWS0031) of which Wagner was a co-investigator. (R. 3164-65, 3180.) Although the

Cytogenetic/molecular testing looks for a chromosomal translocation in which a specific
gene (FLU) within chromosome 11 has moved to chromosome 22, and a specific gene
(EWS) within chromosome 22 has moved to chromosome 11. This "11;22 translocation"
is found in 85-95 percent of Ewing's patients. (R. 2668, 3207, 3374.)
5

Clinical Trial says it "should NOT be used to direct the practice of medicine by any
person or to provide individualized medical care, treatment, or advice to any patient or
study subject" (emphasis in original), Wagner says that his handling of Parker's case was
pursuant to the AEWS0031 protocol. (R. 3180-3184; Case No. 2:05-cv-00739, Doc. 18
(Wagner Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, November 22, 2005, p. 15 Tf 38).)
The AEWS0031 Clinical Trial was for patients with newly diagnosed Ewing's that
had not metastasized (spread).

(R. 3372.)

Very few patients present with newly

diagnosed, localized Ewing's. (R. 1485, 2734-35, 2738, 3262.) If Wagner wanted to
enroll Parker in the AEWS0031 Trial, he had to do so within 30 days of the "diagnostic
biopsy." (R. 0515, Ex. 65, p. 17.) Wagner calendared the date of biopsy as May 2. (R.
3378-79, 3382.) However, a medical article cited by Wagner measured the deadline from
the date of diagnosis, which would have been May 20. (R. 3386.)
The AEWS0031 Trial "strongly recommended" molecular testing to confirm
Ewing's. (R. 3375.) Genetic/molecular testing was a reasonable request, and would have
been performed had Wagner requested it. (R. 1537-40, 2781-82, 2815.)

Defendant

Albritton is unaware of anyone at PCMC ever refusing such testing. (R. 1539-40.)
Wagner claims that a pathologist, Cheryl Coffin, told him that genetic/molecular
testing was not necessary. However, Coffin testified that she considers such testing
"incredibly useful," would not have been opposed if it had been requested, does not know
why genetic/molecular testing was not done on Parker's tissue, and is not aware of
anyone who was opposed to such testing. (R. 1774-75, 1770, 1793.)
Removing additional tissue from Parker's mouth (an "oncologic" excision) to
6

obtain a new sample would also have alleviated a concern of Albritton's, which was that
there were still tumor cells in Parker's mouth. Wagner falsely told Albritton that he had
recommended an oncologic procedure to the Jensens. (R. 1503-1506.) However, when
the Jensens asked about the originally scheduled margin, Wagner told them that, rather
than removing the remaining tumor from Parker's mouth immediately, a second surgery
would not be performed until after twelve weeks of chemotherapy (which was a
requirement of the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial protocol). (R. 2135-36, 2353-54.)
The Jensens were confused. They had read that the first thing to do with cancer is
get all of the cancerous material out. (R. 2645-46.) Dr. Albritton testified that it is
important to get all of the tumor out as soon as possible; she cannot think of any good
reason to leave part of it in. (R. 1528-29.)
Barbara Jensen again asked Wagner if there was any other test that would help
confirm the diagnosis of Ewing's, and he said no. (R. 2154-55.) At this point, all other
tests (x-rays, CT and bone scans, blood tests, MRI) had come back normal. (R. 0515 (Ex.
12, pp. 49-61), 2131,2376-78, 3275-76, 3278-79, 3318-20, 3325.)
Another of Barbara's brothers referred the Jensens to a cancer specialist he knew
in Oklahoma. This doctor told the Jensens that the staging process for Ewing's would
include blood tests, x-rays, bone, CT, and PET scans, MRIs, and other tests like genetic
tests. (R. 2125-26, 2152-53, 2342-43, 2345, 2482, 2645-46.) The Jensens told Wagner
they wanted all the tests that this doctor mentioned and that they saw on the National
Cancer Institute and other websites, which included genetic testing. (R. 2361-62.)
Wagner now claims that he did not know that the Jensens were questioning the
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diagnosis, or he would have requested genetic/molecular testing.

(R. 3237-38.)

However, on May 21, 2003, the Jensens had asked Wagner to send a "blind" sample to
Harvard University for testing, which Wagner admits was because they had a question
about the diagnosis. (R. 2306, 2365-67, 3239.)
Wagner sent Parker's slides to a pathologist at Harvard who was a fellow
investigator for the AEWS0031 Clinical Trial (R. 3373, 3239). Instead of the blind
second opinion the Jensens requested, however, Wagner sent an e-mail denigrating their
request for a second opinion, and urging the pathologist to agree with the "confident"
diagnosis by his "expert" pathologist as quickly as possible.

He alerted his co-

investigator that "the child was now 19 days post resection." (R. 3427-28.) Wagner also
said that he did not want to "slow things down" by submitting a claim to the Jensens'
insurer, and that the Jensens had agreed to pay for the testing personally. (R. 3428.)
Upon learning that Wagner had not honored their request for a blind second
opinion, the Jensens decided to have the testing performed elsewhere. They did not have
confidence that Wagner would obtain a truly independent opinion. (R. 2370-71, 2626.)
The Jensens had believed the initial testing, but were starting to wonder both about the
diagnosis and Wagner's insistence on immediate chemotherapy. Some red flags:
•

The Jensens could find no reported cases of Ewing's in the mouth (R. 2164);

•

The survival rates quoted by Wagner kept changing as he urged them to start
chemotherapy (70, then 85, then 90 percent) (R. 2239-40, 2356, 2392-93, 260506), and Wagner seemed irritated by legitimate questions, such as why Parker
would need 45 weeks of chemotherapy if another biopsy at twelve weeks came
back negative (R. 2357-58);

•

Wagner had given them the names of the chemotherapy drugs that would be used
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by writing them on a napkin (R. 2400);
•

A margin had been scheduled and then canceled, which seemed inconsistent with
application of a standard procedure (R. 2124);

•

Leaving a deadly tumor in Parker's mouth for another three months seemed
counterintuitive (R. 2645-46);

•

Wagner insisted that Parker must be experiencing eating and sleeping difficulties
and losing weight, which the Jensens told him was not happening (R. 2378-79);

•

The Jensens asked Wagner about Lowichik's comment that "cytogenetic" testing
might be informative, but Wagner said it was unnecessary and did not explain why
(R. 2372-75, 2395-96).
On May 28, 2003, the Jensens consulted with Dr. Judith Moore, a family doctor at

the Modem Health Clinic in Bountiful that had successfully treated Barbara's father for
prostate cancer. (R. 2225-26.) The Jensens told Moore that, if they had an objective
confirmation of Parker's diagnosis, they would agree to chemotherapy. (R. 2960-61.)
From Parker's records and the length of time involved, Moore told the Jensens that she
was not convinced that Parker had Ewing's. (R. 1695, 2486, 2952-56,2961.)
The Clinic's treatment of Barbara's father had been with a form of chemotherapy
called Insulin Potentiation Therapy (IPT). (R. 2165, 2225-26.)

The Jensens asked

whether IPT might be a potential treatment if Parker had Ewing's, and requested
information to take to their oncologist. (R. 1691, 1693-94, 1700-01.) At a May 29, 2003,
meeting, the Jensens asked Wagner to "look into" IPT. (R. 2139-41, 3395.)
At the meeting, Barbara said, "There's got to be another test that can narrow it
down more than just maybe or invisible." Wagner said there was not. (R. 2150, 218385.) Moore had recommended a PET scan, which Wagner admits are positive in most
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patients with Ewing's, but Wagner refused the request. (R. 2380-81, 2947-48, 3218-20.)3
Daren expressed concern that treatment would not be effective unless the cancer
were definitively identified, and said it seemed odd that the exact same treatment would
be given to Parker as to someone with a large tumor in his leg. (R. 3395.) Daren's
instincts were correct. Several years earlier, superficial soft tissue Ewing's had been
identified as a prognostically favorable subset in which chemotherapy is not always
administered.

(R. 2080-83.)

Parker's growth was superficial and in the squamous

epithelium (the tissue beneath the tongue, essentially a form of skin). (R. 2049-50., 206365.)
Since the LabCorp and PCMC reports did not state the same diagnosis, the Jensens
asked Wagner to test another sample from Parker's mouth, but Wagner refused. (R.
2401-02.) His response "floored" the Jensens, who thought, "why wouldn't you do
additional testing, even if it was just as a safety point[?]" (R. 2577-78.) Daren explained
that he was "just trying to get enough information so I can determine how to proceed with
Parker." Wagner interrupted, "You don't have the decision on how we treat Parker. You
can be a part of the decision." (R. 2402-03.)
Wagner told pathologist Lowichik that the Jensens had given him an article about
IPT in which a Ewing's patient had gotten better. Rather than show her the article,
Wagner told her that the article was quite old and that immunohistochemistry had not

Moore then prescribed the PET scan, the results of which were normal. (R. 2947-48,
3525.) The PET scan did not show cancer in Parker's mouth, where the cancer cells
supposedly were located. (R. 2965-66.)
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been performed. He asked Lowichik to speculate, without reading it, on whether the
patient in the article might not have had Ewing's. (R. 2801.)
On June 2, 2003, a social worker working with Wagner called defendant Kari
Cunningham, a DCFS case worker, with a "heads up" that DCFS might become involved.
(R. 1873.) On June 5, Wagner called Daren, who was out of town, and demanded that he
come in. Wagner said that if he did not, Wagner would "take his child" in "three days."
(R. 2405-06.) A meeting was scheduled for June 9. (R. 0515 (Ex. 15, p. 20); 2410-11.)
At the meeting, the Jensens again asked if a new sample could be taken and tested,
but the request was refused. (R. 2417, 2422-23.) According to Wagner's notes, the
Jensens were asked about their plans regarding IPT, and "[fjather indicated that he was
still reviewing this information." (R. 2644, 3408.) The Jensens complained that PCMC
was jumping into treatment when they were still asking about the diagnosis. (R. 2161.)
A PCMC risk management employee in attendance then "leaned forward in her
chair like she was picking up a card off the table and showed it to us like this." She said
she didn't want to, but "I have a card to play." She said she could report the Jensens to
DCFS and "have your child in three days." The Jensens replied, "We're going to go find
another hospital that will work with us. You're fired." (R. 2156-57, 2162, 2412.)
On June 12, Wagner went to DCFS liaison Dr. David Corwin, reporting, "patient
with Ewing's sarcoma; family refusing conventional therapy and seeking unproven
alternative treatment methods." (R. 3378-79, 3396, 1810-11.) Wagner did not disclose
that the Jensens were seeking confirmation of Parker's diagnosis. Id.
Dr. Corwin called Daren Jensen, who expressed concern about Wagner's refusal to
11

run additional tests before starting chemotherapy. Daren stated that the Jensens had not
decided that IPT was a solution for Parker, and mentioned that they were planning a
margin to remove the surrounding tissue. (R. 1815, 1825, 2426-28, 2639.)
Daren agreed to another meeting. Dr. Corwin said he was going out of town for a
few days, so a meeting was set for his return on Friday, which meeting it was believed Dr.
Moore might attend. Corwin knew that the Jensens had confidence in Moore. (R. 182324, 1829, 1833, 2429, 2440.) Corwin told Wagner about the meeting, but Wagner said
they could not wait that long. Corwin asked, "How much difference does a few days
make?" but Wagner said it was "urgent." (R. 1824-1830.) Corwin told Wagner that the
Jensens were planning another resection of the tumor, which made sense to Corwin, but
Wagner said no, it should be left in. (R. 1826-27.) Corwin assumed that, if other
diagnostic tests were available that had not been run, Wagner would have told him. (R.
1819-1820.)

At Wagner's insistence, Corwin called Daren Jensen and canceled the

meeting, stating that the Jensens would be reported to DCFS instead. (R. 2429.)
Meanwhile, Wagner falsely told his supervisor that he had provided all
information he could to the family regarding the diagnosis, and that the Jensens had not
given him any material on IPT. (R. 2754-55, 2760.) Wagner further said that Daren
Jensen had canceled the meeting, and that "there were no further opportunities to meet
with the Jensens[.]" (R. 2758-59, 2763, 2765.) Wagner also claimed to have discussed
numerous other things with the Jensens that he had not. (R. 2743-48,2751-53.)
At a June 16, 2003, meeting, Wagner presented a "case summary" to DCFS that
contained several material misrepresentations and omissions, including:
12

•

that the May 20 biopsy results "confirmed" Ewing's, when Wagner knew that
immunohistochemical staining cannot definitively diagnose Ewing's;

•

that "[t]he Jensens requested a second opinion of the sample from Dana Farber
Clinic at Harvard University. Dr. Wagner agreed to this, and the sample was sent
to Boston," omitting that the sample was never tested at Dana-Farber, that he had
denied a blind test, and that he had attempted to influence the outcome of the test;

•

that "On May 21, 2003, Parker underwent a CT and bone scan," omitting that the
results were normal;

•

that "On May 29,2003, Mr. and Ms. Jensen told Dr. Wagner that they wanted to
use Insulin Potentiation Therapy as an alternative to chemotherapy," which was
contrary to PCMC's own notes that the parents only asked Wagner to "look into"
IPT, and also that "IPT therapy was listed on a website called Quackwatch," which
he knew was untrue (R. 3395, 3398);

•

that at the June 9 meeting, Wagner "asked the family if any more information
would be helpful. The family declined." when the Jensens had in fact asked for
testing of a new sample and been refused;

•

that the Jensens had refused to meet again, when it was Wagner who refused.
Based upon Wagner's report, a referral was made to DCFS on June 16, 2003, and

assigned to defendant Kari Cunningham, whose office was in a hallway at PCMC. (R.
1887-90, 2763-64, 3411). Cunningham did not want to be a social worker, and did not
like doing investigations. (R. 1852, 1857-59.) She considered her workload too high,
and the first thing she did with the Jensen case was unsuccessfully try to get another
DCFS office to handle it. (R. 1859-60, 1865-68, 1899-1900.)
Cunningham knew that it was her duty to investigate Wagner's allegation of
medical neglect, and that the office of the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) would rely in part on
her investigation. (R. 1557-58, 1560-61, 1862-64, 1869, 1960-62.) Instead, she simply
assumed Wagner's allegations to be true and performed no investigation at all. (R. 187513

76, 1891, 1893-97, 1906-09, 1922-1927.) Although state law required Cunningham to
contact the alleged victim's parents (R. 3431), she decided not to contact the Jensens, and
instead to get their side of the story entirely from the person who was reporting them. (R.
1903-05) Cunningham took the position that, if a doctor's complaint seemed reasonable
to her, she would not investigate it. She never once ran a medical neglect allegation past
another doctor. (R. 1863, 1870-71, 1874-75.)
Cunningham never contacted Dr. Moore or considered letting the Jensens rely on
her recommendations because Wagner said that Moore was not qualified to treat Parker.
(R. 1883-84, 1913-14.) Wagner said it was an emergency, and that Cunningham needed
to do something within days. (R. 1879-80.) He did not disclose that Parker's parents
were questioning the diagnosis and had requested additional diagnostic tests, which
Cunningham would have considered important.

(R. 1879, 1881.)

Wagner gave

Cunningham the impression that he had done everything he could do diagnostically; he
never mentioned the availability of genetic or molecular testing. (R. 1904-05, 1910-11.)
On June 17, 2003, Cunningham signed under oath a Verified Petition and Motion
to Transfer Custody and Guardianship. (R. 3435-39.) The verified petition contained
several factual misrepresentations, e.g., that the Jensens had "indicated their intent to use
IPT" when the Jensens had said they were reviewing the possibility; that "Dr. David
Corwin was consulted for an independent assessment," when Cunningham knew that
Corwin was a psychiatrist consulted in connection with reporting the Jensens to DCFS,
not for an "independent assessment" of Parker's medical condition; and that "the father
[Daren]" canceled the Friday meeting, when it was Wagner. (R. 3435-39.) The petition
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also omitted material facts, including that she had not conducted any investigation; that
the parents were questioning the diagnosis, that confirmatory tests had not been run, and
that, if Parker did have Ewing's, it was a very unusual form. (R. 3435-39.)
DCFS filed a Motion for Expedited Hearing, specifying a hearing date of June 20,
2003. (R. 0515 (Ex. 10, pp. 0007-16).) The filings were dated June 17, but were not filed
or served until June 18, id., so the "three days" Wagner had touted turned out to be two.4
At about this time, Wagner e-mailed Cunningham a page from Principles and
Practice of Pediatric Oncology by Pizzo and Poplack, "the primary pediatric solid tumor
textbook," that discussed chemotherapy. (R. 2687, 2741-42, 3188-90.) Wagner omitted
pages that said that "molecular diagnosis has become the gold standard" for diagnosing
Ewing's, that an 11;22 translocation was definitive, and that repeatedly emphasized the
superiority of genetic/molecular testing to confirm a Ewing's diagnosis. (R. 3358-63.)
Meanwhile, the Jensens scrambled to find an attorney. (R. 2329a-30.) Eventually,
they found Frank Mylar, a former Assistant A.G. who had served as general counsel to
the Utah Department of Health and to the Department of Corrections. (R. 3505-06.)
A friend told the Jensens that he had a connection with a cancer specialist in
Vienna, Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer, whose resume said he had received a medical degree from

4

The timing of the two-day hearing might not be coincidental. If the enrollment deadline
were measured from the date of diagnosis, as in the New England Journal of Medicine
article, Day 30 would have been June 20, 2003, which might explain why Wagner told
Corwin he could not wait three days to meet with the Jensens on June 20 even though
Corwin wanted to; why the DCFS filings were backdated so that the "three day" hearing
could be held on June 20; and why Wagner told Cunningham at the June 16 staffing that
Parker could be dead in "five days."
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the University of Munich, served as a visiting research fellow at several American
universities and head of the Division of Tumor Oncology at the University of Munich,
and was a member of the American Association of Cancer Research. (R. 3366.)
The Jensens faxed Parker's medical records to Dr. Birkmayer, who told them he
questioned whether Parker had cancer. (R. 2170-71, 2485.) Birkmayer agreed to perform
an independent evaluation, including new tests on the slides. (R. 2603-04.) Anticipating
the consultation, the Jensens applied for a passport for Parker. (R. 3278-79, 3678.)
The Jensens also called the oral surgeon's office to schedule the margin. (R.
2434.)

The surgeon immediately called Dr. Muntz, who said he did not object to

repeating a biopsy. Muntz said that the Jensens were refusing chemotherapy, and asked
the surgeon to encourage them to begin treatment. (R. 1717-19,1721, 3288.)
The oral surgeon understood that the Jensens wanted "an objective second
opinion," which seemed reasonable to him. (R. 1735-36, 1718.) However, instead of
honoring the Jensens' request for a blind second opinion, he called a close friend
pathologist at the University of Washington, who agreed to "help out." (R. 1705-06,
1724, 1740-44, 2117-18.) The surgeon mailed the new sample to his friend, underlining
"Ewing's" as a reminder. (R. 1729, 3585.)
Upon receiving the sample, the surgeon's friend called LabCorp to get their earlier
results, ran a few tests that are facially inadequate to diagnose Ewing's, got a copy of Dr.
Lowichik's report, wrote a report stating that a finding of a non-specific antigen (CD 99)
"supported" the diagnosis (omitting the results of one key test that apparently turned out
negative), signed her name and the name of another pathologist who had no involvement,
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and sent the report to the surgeon. (R. 0515 (Ex. 38), 2066-2070, 2075, 3291-93.)5
On June 19, the Jensens and their attorney consulted a doctor at LDS Hospital who
told them that "he found no present evidence of Ewing's Sarcoma or any other cancer but
that he was uncomfortable second-guessing the doctors at Primary." (R. 2494-95, 350809.) He predicted that the second pathology review might change the diagnosis, but that
it would still be in the same "category" as Ewing's. (R. 3073-74.)
The Jensens appeared in juvenile court the next day. Representing DCFS was
defendant Assistant A.G. Susan Eisenman (R. 1962-64), who assumed that Cunningham
had performed the statutorily prescribed investigation. (R. 1960-62,2030.) At the June
20 hearing, Mylar indicated that the Jensens were obtaining "further tests on the actual
sample" (R. 0515, Ex. 33a, pp. 5-6). The juvenile court continued the case until July 10
in the hope that the parties would reach a resolution. (R. 3454-55.)
On June 23, 2003, Dr. Birkmayer sent Eisenman a letter stating that he had
reviewed Parker's records and would be assuming care of Parker, giving a brief overview
of his credentials and experience. (R. 3529.) Eisenman knew that Birkmayer's letter
raised doubt about the diagnosis, and that the Jensens wanted confirmation of the
diagnosis before beginning treatment. (R. 1994, 3459, 3506, 3509-10.)
On June 25, 2003, Daren called the oral surgeon to ask about the test results from

The UW pathologist later received a request from a hospital for the second sample, but
did not release it. That same day, she removed the uninvolved doctor's name from her
report. (R. 3084-85, 3099-3100, 3602-04.) A later effort by a Boise doctor to get the
second sample from this pathologist also proved unfruitful. (R. 2713.)
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UW. During the call, Christensen admitted that he had told the UW pathologist about the
prior diagnosis, which frustrated Daren and Barbara. (R. 1740, 2119.)
Upon reviewing the UW report, Dr. Birkmayer told the Jensens, "What is going on
over there? CD 99 is not definitive of Ewing's Sarcoma." (R. 2116, 2450, 2633.) Dr.
Moore likewise reaffirmed her doubt as to whether Parker had Ewing's. (R. 2633, 294446, 2957-59, 2962.) However, Moore indicated that she was not interested in getting
involved in a court case. (R. 2144-45, 2221-23, 2620-23, 2556-57.)
On July 2, 2003, defendant Eisenman e-mailed Dr. Birkmayer, inquiring whether
the Jensens were planning on traveling to Vienna, asking for the name of doctors with
whom he usually consulted in the United States, and asking if he was certified to practice
in the United States. Eisenman cited some studies associated with his clinic that she had
found on the internet and asked if he intended to employ the same treatment for Parker.
She stated that the American Academy of Pediatrics had established a standard of care for
pediatric cancer patients in the United States, asked whether there was something similar
in Austria, and requested a copy. She asked Birkmayer for information concerning his
clinical experience and experience with child patients. (R. 1990, 3535.)
Eisenman knew that the AAP guidelines, which did not come from Wagner or the
guardian ad litem (GAL), actually said that they were intended to suggest "state-of-theart" care, and "do not indicate an exclusive course of treatment or serve as a standard of
medical care." (R. 1982-83, 1991,3231-33.)
In another letter dated July 9, Dr. Birkmayer said he was not convinced from the
pathology reports that Parker had Ewing's, citing the lack of definitive testing, the slow
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growth rate, and the location, and suggesting "more precise testing of the tissue prior to
proceeding with a 45-week chemotherapy regimen." (R. 3479-80.)
Eisenman recognized that Dr. Birkmayer had "questioned the diagnosis of Ewingfs
sarcoma." (R. 3546-47.) However, she told Mylar that she would not allow the Jensens to
use Birkmayer because he was not licensed in the United States. (R. 2455-56, 3507.)
Eisenman knew that the State could not legally prohibit parents from taking their child to
another country for medical treatment. (R. 1987-89.)
Eisenman also began insisting to the Jensens' counsel that only a "board-certified
pediatric oncologist" was qualified to treat Parker, and therefore she would not permit the
Jensens to use any physician who was not so certified. (R. 3002-05, 3008-09, 3507-08,
3029-31.) Eisenman knew that the law did not require the Jensens to use a board-certified
pediatric oncologist (R. 1992, 2016). She also knew that Wagner - the doctor who had
reported the Jensens in the first place - was not a board-certified pediatric oncologist. (R.
1980-81.) (Neither was the head of pediatric oncology at PCMC. (R. 2728.))
Trying to find a pediatric oncologist that DCFS would accept, Nakamura called a
pediatric radiologist he knew at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles (CHLA). The
radiologist said that Ewing's in oral tissue would be highly unusual, and it would be
prudent to do additional testing to confirm that it was Ewing's. (R. 2972-75, 2983-84.)
On July 10, 2003, the Jensens went back to juvenile court for a pre-trial
conference. A stipulation was reached in which a Dr. Tishler at CHLA would conduct
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independent testing, and then make recommendations. (R. 2911-12, 3555.)6
After the conference, Eisenman e-mailed Cunningham that "I view today's hearing
as a pretty strong indication from the Judge that he is not going to allow us to intervene
with this family." (R. 1997, 3403.) Eisenman had an emotional tie to the case, telling
Nakamura that she had had a personal situation in her family and she knew that the
Jensens were just in denial. (R. 2993-96.) Eisenman knew, but never disclosed to the
court, that genetic testing was usually done in Ewing's cases, and that other tests were
available to confirm Parker's diagnosis. She admits that "the court might have been
interested in that." (R. 1011 (Ex. 2, pp. 137-138).)
The Jensens arrived at CHLA on July 21, 2003. (R. 3603-04.) Dr. Tishler had not
reviewed Parker's records, and left the room during the meeting to see whether the
samples had arrived yet. He said that no, he had not seen anything yet, which the Jensens
assumed meant that the tissue was not there yet. (R. 2120-21, 2302, 2608-09.)
Tishler admits that he indicated at this meeting that Parker needed chemotherapy
based solely on the earlier pathology reports, not on evaluations by his own institution.
He said that PCMC was a good hospital and he would be inclined to defer to it, even
though he had not read all the documents yet. (R. 2193, 2232, 2464-66, 3088-89, 309899.) The Jensens were dismayed. They understood that the July 10 stipulation required a
fresh evaluation, not a deferral to PCMC. (R. 2234, 2499-2500.) Their attorney and the

6

Nakamura advised the court of one problem that could affect the testing: PCMC had
lost Parker's tissue. (R. 3545.) The samples were missing for nearly two weeks until
"eventually" they were found. (R. 1784, 1974-75, 2813, 2881-82, 3512.)
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GAL had the same understanding. (R. 2885-86, 2911-12, 3015-16.)
Although Tishler said he already had a recommendation based on PCMC's reports,
he said he would have molecular testing done on Parker's tissue. (R. 3088-89, 3094-95,
3113.)

Eisenman, meanwhile, was moving forward with removing Parker from his

parents' custody. Even before the Jensens arrived in Los Angeles, she had drafted a
warrant to take custody. (R. 3412.) Defendant Wagner (who had moved to Ohio) signed
a July 22, 2003, affidavit for that purpose, repeating the misrepresentations and omissions
from his earlier reports to Corwin and DCFS. (R. 3156-57, 3607-09, see p. 12-13, supra)
Because Tishler had already expressed an inclination to defer to PCMC, Daren
called another doctor to whom they had been referred, Dr. Charles B. Simone. (R. 245657, 2502.) From Simone's website, the Jensens concluded that he had served as a
medical oncologist and tumor immunologist at the National Cancer Institute, helped
organize the Office of Alternative Medicine of the National Institutes of Health, and had
authored several books about cancer. (R. 3339-43.)
Simone said he would accept Parker in his care. He said that chemotherapy was a
possibility, but that until he performed a full examination, he could not recommend a
treatment. (R. 2190-02, 2461, 2504-05, 2617.) From Lowichik's original report, Simone
questioned whether Parker might have lymphoma, and recommended that the sample be
sent to an expert at the National Cancer Institute. (R. 2507, 3063-64, 3612-13.)
On July 24, 2003, Tishler at CHLA sent Daren Jensen an e-mail stating, "I have
asked Dr. Gonzales to perform the specific genetic testing we discussed on Tuesday.
After we complete testing here we can release the tissue block to an outside consultant,
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either our colleagues or an institution of your selection." (R. 3617.)
The day before a July 28, 2003, court conference, Dr. Simone told the Jensens and
Nakamura that he was not willing to become involved in a court battle. (R. 2188-89,
2618-19.)

Before court the next day, the Jensens gave Simone's information to

Eisenman. Because Simone only ruled out acting as Parker's primary physician if he
were dragged into a court battle, the Jensens hoped that Eisenman would allow him as
their physician because he was an oncologist. (R. 2246.)
In the July 28 conference, Tishler was conferenced in by phone. (R. 3103-04.) He
said that CHLA's testing was "being done right now," and that it would be completed
after the tissue blocks came back from NCI. (R. 3558.) Tishler had not seen any
pathology report from his institution, and knew that the lab was still working on the
genetic studies. (R. 3104.) He stated, "We will be doing the comprehensive testing and
[treatment] is to occur when we are finished." He estimated he would have the test
results and be prepared to make a final recommendation in ten days. He confirmed that
he would not be issuing a final recommendation until he had those test results. (R. 0515
(Ex. 33c, pp. 23-24), 3481-82, 3560-62.) Based upon the prediction that CHLA's results
and recommendations would be in within ten days, the juvenile court directed that
chemotherapy was to begin by August 8. Id.
When asked whether she could team up with Dr. Simone, defendant Albritton
(Wagner's replacement in the case) stated, "My understanding of the fact is that he is not
board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical oncology." (R. 0515, Ex 33c, pp.
50-51.) At that time, Albritton knew, and did not disclose, that defendant Wagner was
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not a board-certified pediatric oncologist. (R. 1488, 1512, 1980-1981, 3246, 3263-65.)
Cunningham testified that, had she known that Wagner was not a board-certified pediatric
oncologist, she would have brought it to the court's attention at that time. (R. 1924-25,
1931.) The court said that Simone could not be Parker's primary physician. (R. 3562.)
The juvenile court indicated that CHLA's test results would be dispositive (R.
3481-82), and set an evidentiary hearing for August 20 on DCFS's petition for custody.
(R. 2896, 2986-87, 3481-83.)
Tishler never notified anyone that the CHLA testing was complete. Between July
28 and August 8, the GAL called and e-mailed Tishler directly, but Tishler did not report
any test results to her. (R. 2862-63, 2883-84, 2887-88, 3101-02.) On August 4, 2003, Dr.
Tishler sent Eisenman an e-mail, which did not mention any results. (R. 3101, 3616.)
Daren contacted CHLA several times to ask about test results, with no success. (R. 2516,
2607-08.) The Jensens never went back because "they never got back to us and told us
that they had done the test and that he had [Ewing's]." (R. 2178, 3105.)
On July 31, 2003, the National Cancer Institute doctor expert issued a report that
said in part: "The site of presentation would be very unusual for PNET. Furthermore,
FLI-1 protein expression is not specific as vascular tumors can also be positive.
Molecular studies for the 11 ;22 translocation are being performed at Children's Hospital,
and should be helpful in precise classification.

However, the histological and

immunophenotypic features are not those of lymphoma." (R. 3623.)
Because Simone as a primary care physician was no longer an option and CHLA
had already indicated an inclination to defer to PCMC, the Jensens continued to look for
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someone who would perform the independent evaluation they wanted. (R. 2508, 2193.)
They saw a story about a boy with a blastoma whose parents wanted to go to the
Burzynski Clinic in Houston. (R. 2197.) From its website, it appeared that the Clinic had
been studying and treating cancer since 1977, that its staff included a physician who was
board-certified in internal medicine and hematology, and that it "work[ed] with other
nearby medical providers to offer complete treatment for patients." (R. 3334, 3336-37.)
Daren called the Clinic to ask if it had a board-certified pediatric oncologist, and
was told yes. (R. 2204-05, 2480-81, 3129.) (Nakamura was also informed that the Clinic
had a qualified physician on staff who treated cancer (R. 2981-82).) PNET was on the list
of diseases that the Clinic treated (R. 3134-38). The Jensens faxed Parker's records to the
Clinic (R. 2196), and an appointment was made to admit Parker for an evaluation to begin
August 12. (R. 2202, 2247-2248, 2264, 2648, 2658-59.)
The Jensens believed that, if Parker was not in chemotherapy by August 8, they
would be permitted to explain why at the August 20 hearing. (R. 2194-95, 2259, 228889, 2466-67, 2508-11, 2515, 2521-22, 2543.) The Jensens' attorney considered that a
reasonable belief in light of the proceedings to date. (R. 2986-87.) The Jensens, their
attorney, and the GAL all understood that, under the stipulation, the Jensens were not
required to submit Parker to chemotherapy until an independent diagnosis had been
rendered by CHLA based on the results of its testing (R. 2549-50, 2885-86, 2911-12,
3015-16), which had not been issued yet.
In anticipation of the upcoming tests in Houston, Parker suggested a get-together
with extended family members, and a friend volunteered his cabin on the Idaho side of
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Bear Lake. (R. 2268-2270, 2521, 2567.) On the morning of August 8, the Jensens left
with their children and boat for the cabin, where they met other relatives. They planned
to leave their other children with Barbara's parents in Idaho and leave for the Clinic in
Houston on Sunday. (R. 2269-72, 2275, 2518-19, 2526, 2533, 2567.)
Although Eisenman knew that the controlling test results from CHLA were not in
yet, she proceeded with her plan to transfer custody of Parker. At 1 p.m. on August 8, she
called a police officer, Travis Peterson, with whom she was acquainted and told him she
would need help removing a child. (R. 1943-44, 2020-21, 3641.)
Defendant Cunningham signed an affidavit that she admits presented only the
State's side of the story and contained misleading information. (R. 1937, 3440-46.) For
example, Cunningham admits that she knew by then that testing had not been conducted
at Harvard, that Parker's CT and bone scans were normal, and that the Jensens were not
pursuing IPT, all of which was contrary to statements in her affidavit. She never spoke
with a pathologist, as her affidavit claimed. She said the Jensens had consulted "a man"
in Vienna, rather than naming Birkmayer or identifying him as a doctor. (R. 1935-40.)
She claimed that Tishler had said "Parker should commence chemotherapy," when she
knew he had actually said that he would not be making final treatment recommendations
until all of the testing was in, including genetic testing. See p. 22, supra.)1
Eisenman and Cunningham took an order and warrant down to court, where an off-

Cunningham submitted another affidavit on August 18 to continue the custody warrant
that repeated these misrepresentations. (R. 3440-46.)
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the-record hearing occurred in chambers. (R. 2861, 3481-83.) The Jensens' attorney,
Nakamura, was contacted by telephone, and told the court about the Jensens'
arrangements with the Burzynski Clinic. (R. 2011, 2024.)
Cunningham paged defendant Albritton, who represented that Burzynski was
"NOT a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic is well known for
providing extremely controversial therapy." (R. 1943, 2024-25) (emphasis in original).)
Albritton did not disclose that another doctor at the clinic was board-certified. She also
represented that the Clinic was only conducting clinical trials of nonapproved FDA
treatments of cancer not involving chemotherapy (R. 2012, 2863-64, 3032-34), which was
untrue.

The Clinic offered chemotherapy, and FDA trials were only one of its

departments. (R. 3121-22, 3125, 3132-34.)
No one informed the court that the CHLA test results were not in yet. (R. 2863.)
The judge signed Eisenman's order and warrant transferring custody of Parker to the
State. (R. 2013, 2027, 3485-86.) Cunningham then went to the Jensens' house to execute
the warrant. A neighbor said she thought they had gone water skiing, as they had taken
their boat with them, and a note appeared to have had been left by another neighbor. It
was evident that the Jensens "had been gone all day." (R. 2866-68, 3642.)
At about 6 p.m., Daren was informed by Nakamura that a "pickup order" had been
issued, and that Parker was to be placed in DCFS custody to start chemotherapy. (R.
2273, 2529.) After consulting with an attorney in Idaho, the Jensens concluded that the
best action would be to get the evaluation and then bring Parker back for the August 20
evidentiary hearing. Otherwise, the State would take him and begin chemotherapy, and
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they would never get the second opinion they wanted. (R. 2278-79, 2532, 2535-39.)
The next day, Cunningham went back to the Jensens' home to execute the warrant,
recording in her activity log that it was apparent that the Jensens had not returned home.
(R. 3720.) Eisenman faxed a letter to the Burzynski Clinic prohibiting it from seeing
Parker, and requesting that she be contacted immediately if the Jensens came there. (R.
2014-15, 2891-92, 3732.) On August 13, she made another report to Officer Peterson,
who opened up a new case file. (R. 3658-61) She also arranged for a meeting with the
Salt Lake County District Attorney's office. (R. 0515 (Ex. 33d, p. 12), 1946, 2904-05.)
Later that day, an unscheduled conference call took place with the juvenile court in
which the August 20 evidentiary hearing was changed to a status/review hearing. (R.
0515 (Ex. 33d, pp. 12, 14).) During that call, Eisenman misrepresented that the Jensens
"have not responded to phone calls left on their cell phone or home phone" (R. 0515 (Ex.
33d, p. 3)), when no such messages had been left. (R. 2545-47.)
Eisenman subsequently realized that no order had ever been entered on the July 28
hearing. (R. 2026.) (The minutes of the hearing had not been filed until August 11 (R.
3735-36).) Someone arranged for an order to be signed on August 15, 2003. (R. 370204.) That same day, the meeting Eisenman had arranged was held with Deputy D.A.
Angela Micklos. (R. 2919, 3744.) Based upon a (mis)representation by Eisenman that
the Jensens had fled the state after the August 8 order transferring custody was issued,
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Micklos elevated the charges to felony child kidnapping. (R 2928-29.) Warrants on the
felony charges were activated nationwide, and extradition was initiated. (R. 2917-18,
2923-25, 3683, 3764-73, 3777, 3781.)
Eisenman knew that the Jensens had not fled the state after issuance of the custody
order. Among other things, she had Cunningham's logs (R. 1961), which said the Jensens
had not been home all day when Cunningham arrived with the warrant. It also seems
inherently improbable that two people fleeing the state would haul their boat with them
and their other children, who could have remained at home with Barbara's brother.
While still in Idaho, Barbara Jensen let Parker drive her Suburban down her
parents' driveway to get the mail. He had an accident, and neighbors called the police.
(R. 2280-83.) Daren Jensen was arrested on the child kidnapping warrant, and spent four
days in jail until his father-in-law was able to post $5,000 bail. (R. 2569.)
Barbara left for Houston with Parker, another son, and her mother. (R. 2318,
2320.) Upon arrival, however, she received a message from the Clinic: Based upon
Eisenman's letter, don't come here. (R. 2206-07.) Barbara and Parker could not return
home; news reports flashed their photographs repeatedly and said they were the subject of
a manhunt. (R. 2323-24.)
The August 20, 2003, review hearing proceeded without the Jensens. At the

Eisenman does not admit making the statement, but the only persons at the meeting with
knowledge of the Jensens were Eisenman, Cunningham, and the GAL, and it was not the
latter two. (R. 1946-48, 2905-08.) Around this same time, an assistant A.G. made the
same statement to Attorney General Mark Shurtleff; Eisenman was the only AAG on the
case, and she met with Shurtleff at about that time. (R. 2039, 3042-43, 3053-55.)
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hearing, Eisenman made several factual misrepresentations, including:
•

"to this date I have never received anything from Dr. Birkmayer other than a
letter," when she had received three letters, and had told the Jensens they could
not use Birkmayer;

•

"From Dr. Simone I have never received anything other than a letter," failing to
disclose her knowledge of a telephone call on July 30 from Simone to PCMC
in which Simone stated a belief that he could convince the Jensens to have
appropriate treatment for Parker. (R. 3620);

•

"From the L.A. Children's Hospital I have received nothing except for the
telephone information that I solicited from Dr. Tishler," failing to disclose the
August 4 e-mail she had received from Tishler;

•

"Ifm going to state for the record that I did contact the Birkmayer Clinic to ask
them what kind of treatment they had for Parker. Mr. Mylar sent me a letter
asking me not to contact them further and I never heard a response." (R. 0515
(Ex. 33E, p. 22).) That was untrue. Mylar responded to all requests for
information from Eisenman. (R. 3508.)

The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 8-10, 2003. (R. 3569-70.)
On August 22, 2003, defendant Cunningham issued a finding that the medical
neglect allegations against the Jensens were substantiated. (R. 1949-50, 3344-45.) At
that time, her records reflected total activity on the case of 3 hours and 46 minutes, of
which one hour consisted of a meeting between Parker and the GAL (not Cunningham).
(R. 1919, 1921.) Cunningham later went back and padded her logs with nine more hours,
including non-existent activities {e.g., recording time for a hearing that she did not
attend). (R. 1915-1920, 1945.)
In September 2003, Eisenman left for a new job. (R. 2028-29.) At that time, she
made a number of factual misrepresentations and omissions to her supervisor, including:
•

Failing to disclose that DCFS/Cunningham had not investigated the
reporting doctor's allegations, which he would have recognized as
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improper.
•

Failing to disclose that the Jensens had asked for genetic testing and been
refused.

•

Misrepresenting that the Jensens had fled the state after the warrants were
issued.

•
•

Misrepresenting that the Jensens had chosen not to use Dr. Birkmayer.
Misrepresenting that the Jensens had declined a second opinion from
Harvard because their insurance would not pay for it.

(R. 3038-39, 3042-43, 3045-49, 3053-55.)
At the request of the Utah governor's office, DCFS director Richard Anderson
flew to Idaho and met with Daren Jensen. (R. 1570-71, 2579-80, 3813-14.) Anderson
told the Jensens that he would be running the case from then on. (R. 2583-84.)
Anderson relied in part on a factual timeline provided by Eisenman (R. 1551,
1972-73, 3813-14), which contained numerous misrepresentations and omissions. For
example, Eisenman omitted the key fact that the Jensens were questioning the diagnosis,
and instead represented that the Jensens were simply rejecting chemotherapy as a
treatment. Eisenman's timeline also:
•

Falsely indicated that the Jensens were pursuing IPT as of July 10, when she
had been informed by the Jensens' attorney a week earlier that the Jensens were
not committed to IPT. (R. 3509, 3515-16.)

•

Misrepresented that a second opinion was not obtained from Harvard because
the Jensens "declined to pay the consultation fee." (R. 2370-71, 2639.)

•

Misrepresented that the LDS Hospital doctor had performed "a PET scan and
other tests," when he had performed no tests at all (R. 3076), and that
Eisenman had no records of this consultation, when the Jensens' attorney had
given her a copy of a letter from him. (R. 3509.)

•

Misrepresented that Wagner did not contact DCFS until after the June 9
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meeting, when DCFS's own records showed contact on June 2.
•

Misrepresented that the Jensens had canceled the Friday meeting, when it was
Wagner who canceled.

•

Misrepresented that PCMC oncologists did not know that a second excision
was going to be performed on Parker's tissue, when Wagner was informed of it
ahead of time, and the procedure itself was cleared with Dr. Muntz at PCMC.

•

Misrepresented that the Jensens voluntarily chose not to use Dr. Birkmayer,
when she had told them they could not use Birkmayer.

•

Omitted the key fact that the Jensens were not required to begin treatment until
CHLA completed genetic testing, the results of which had not been received by
August 8 (which Eisenman knew, having received the most recent
communication from Tishler on August 4, which did not mention any results);

•

Implied that it was the police, rather than she, who contacted the District
Attorney's office to pursue criminal charges.

At the meeting in Idaho, Anderson was impressed by the extent of the Jensens'
research. (R. 1568, 1572, 1616, 3813-14.) He told Daren, "I understand you're a great
parent. I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't have it over. It's gone too far."
He later reiterated to Barbara and Daren that he could tell they weren't neglectful parents,
but that things had gone too far and he couldn't let them go. (R. 2293, 2581-82, 2585.)
Anderson concluded that the events to date were consistent with DCFS policy,
because Cunningham had been told that Parker could die in "five days" if chemotherapy
did not begin, which triggered "emergency" procedures. (R. 1552-53, 1596, 1610-1611,
1681-82.) But for that representation, Anderson says, the Jensens would have received a
"thorough pre-removal investigation," including a meeting with the caseworker to discuss
concerns and options. (R. 1556-58, 1614-15, 1671.)
However, there is evidence that DCFS's custom and/or policy was not to
31

investigate medical neglect reports made by a PCMC doctor. (R. 1676-77.) Thus, for
example, DCFS usually obtained second opinions from PCMC on reports from outside
doctors, but the reverse was not true. (R. 2031-33, 2831-32, 2836; see also p. 12-13,
supra) Furthermore, even under DCFS's emergency provisions, Cunningham was still
required to, and did not, "meet with the parents, attempt to negotiate voluntary
compliance with medical treatment pending or in lieu of court involvement, and assess
and document the parents' reasons for refusal to treat." (R. 3431.)
Defendant Anderson had the authority to (and eventually did) authorize the
dismissal of DCFS's medical neglect allegations against the Jensens. (R. 1564, 3018-19.)
However, he was unwilling to do so even if a licensed physician assumed care of Parker,
because it was his position that, if there were conflicting opinions between a parent's
physician and a physician upon whom DCFS was relying, the parents could not make the
choice; instead, DCFS would require them to go to court and have the court decide "the
more credible or the best treatment that is going to happen from the recommendation of
the State or the parents." (R. 1565-67, 1678.) Anderson also refused to authorize a
dismissal unless Parker was treated by a board-certified pediatric oncologist. Although he
says his hands were tied by prior court orders, he admits that he had the authority to
eliminate that requirement, and eventually did. (R. 1577-78.)
At the August 29, 2003, meeting, Anderson "agreed . . . to go back and get the
warrants lifted." (R. 1575, 1594.) Barbara and Parker were then able to rejoin their
family in Idaho. Immediately after a September 3 hearing, however, new warrants were
issued. (Docket in Criminal Case, 09-03-03 entry.)
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By this time, the Jensens were struggling financially. Daren had lost his job after
the neglect proceedings began, and his health insurance had lapsed. (R. 2587.) Anderson
initially said that the State would pay for additional testing, but only if the Jensens agreed
to place Parker in foster care. (R. 2587-88.)
To meet Anderson's requirement of a board-certified pediatric oncologist, the
Jensens agreed to have a Boise physician, Dr. Johnston, perform an independent
evaluation, including new testing. (R. 0515 (Ex. 33h, p. 9).) Anderson understood that,
under this September 5, 2003, stipulation, Johnston was not to make recommendations
until the testing was completed. (R. 1586-87.) Contrary to the stipulation, however,
Johnston informed Anderson that he had told the Jensens at their first meeting that he had
a "strong inclination" and there was "every indication" that he was going to recommend
chemotherapy. (R. 1588, 1598-99,2473-74,2669.)
At that first meeting, Dr. Johnston informed the Jensens that he had learned from
CHLA that its genetic testing had been unable to document an 11 ;22 translocation. (R.
2474-75, 3090, 3303.) (This was the first time anyone heard any results from CHLA. (R.
2473.))

Speculating that CHLA's negative result resulted from degradation of the

sample's RNA, Johnston had the sample sent to Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane
for molecular testing using DNA. (R. 3303.) Johnston then called Anderson and said that
he was going to call the Jensens in two days and recommend chemotherapy, even though
the genetic testing was not back yet. (R. 1601, 1604-06.) Anderson did not disclose that
communication to the Jensens or the juvenile court.
On September 26, 2003, Dr. Johnston announced, "I learned yesterday that the
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cytogenetics lab at Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane has confirmed a t(ll;22)
translocation in Parker's tumor cells, confirming the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma." (R.
3807.) Johnston admits that this statement was not true. Sacred Heart reported "a"
rearrangement involving the 22 chromosome, but could not confirm an 11;22
translocation.

(R.2060, 2676-78, 2701-03, 3817-22.)

Rearrangements of the 22

chromosome are not specific to Ewing's. (R. 2057-58, 2098-99, 3165-66, 3204-05.)9
It was evident to Dr. Johnston that all of the pathologists prior to his involvement
had been reluctant to call Parker's condition Ewing's. (R. 1791-92, 2699; also 2696-2701
("suggestion" and "consistent with" indicate uncertainty). Johnston's pathologist was
also hesitant because the immunohistochemical testing was equivocal. Therefore, he and
Johnston decided to defer to the original PCMC pathologist and call it Ewing's. (R.
1600, 2214-15, 2235-37, 2476, 2560-61, 2719-21, 3303, 3572-73, 3576-77.)
The Jensens balked at Johnston's actions. Shortly afterward, defendant Anderson
agreed to stop insisting on a board-certified pediatric oncologist, and allowed Parker to be
treated by any licensed physician. He approved a motion to voluntarily dismiss the DCFS
petition. (R. 1587-91.)
Criminal charges in Utah were still pending, on which the Jensens had been
booked and released in September. (R. 3760, 3784.) The child kidnapping charges
carried a mandatory minimum sentence higher than that for first-degree murder, and

Johnston says he does not know why he "misspoke," but admits that he became
"wrapped up in this whole situation to the point that it became a bit of an obsession." (R.
2692.)
34

going to trial would have cost the Jensens thousands of dollars. (R. 3022-23, 3025.) In
exchange for a dismissal of the first-degree felony charges, the Jensens were required to
enter into a plea in abeyance on the misdemeanor custodial interference charges. (R.
3778-79, 3823-24.) The Jensens had to admit to factual elements necessary to support the
prima facie elements of the misdemeanor offense, but were not required to disclaim the
existence of defenses that could have been asserted at trial. (R. 2926-27.) The Jensens'
pleas were not to be entered as a conviction. They would be held for 12 months, at the
end of which they would be withdrawn, replaced with not-guilty pleas, and the case
would be dismissed. (R. 2926-27, 3021-22.)
On October 31, 2003, the GAL forwarded an e-mail to Eisenman from Dr.
Johnston in which Johnston said that he "spoke to Dr. Moore, who is taking care of
Parker now. She actually sounds pretty reasonable." (R. 3413.) In November 2003, the
Jensens had a margin performed on Parker. (R. 2114-15, 2216.) A Stanford University
pathologist examined the tissue removed and reported no sign of cancer. (R. 2942-43.)
The Jensens took Parker to see Dr. Moore regularly, but eventually stopped
because Moore said there was nothing to treat. (R. 2252, 2941-43.) Cunningham's
neglect finding was changed from supported to unsupported, but the Jensens are still in
the DCFS system. (R. 1679-80, 1916-17.) Six years later, Parker is alive and well.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's ruling that res judicata bars the Jensens' state law claims is
erroneous for several reasons. The court first erred in deferring to the federal court's
interpretation of the federal constitution without undertaking any independent assessment
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of the Jensens' state law claims or the record. It is contrary to principles of state
constitutional analysis to accept an interpretation of the federal constitution as the
presumptive scope of state constitutional rights.
The court further erred in ruling that the Utah Constitution did not afford the
Jensens any protections against the type of conduct reflected in the record.

The

inalienable rights recognized and guaranteed by Article I, § 1, include the fundamental
right to make decisions regarding one's family, including health matters. Interference
with those rights is presumptively unconstitutional, unless a defendant can prove that his
actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. None of the types
of alleged misconduct here (misrepresentation and omissions, forcing the Jensens to
follow the recommendations of a state-preferred physician rather than the physician of
their choice, reporting the Jensens to DCFS because they refused to start chemotherapy
without reasonably requested diagnostic testing, and failing to investigate medical neglect
allegations before making them) satisfies either criterion.
Similarly, precedent form this Court and sister courts, clear and longstanding
statutory prohibitions, and the background and intent of the Framers contradict the trial
court's (implicit) ruling that the defendants' actions were not violative of the substantive
and procedural due process rights guaranteed in Article I, § 7.
With respect to Article I, § 14 (search and seizure), a state actor's making of material
misrepresentations and omissions to a court and others to is inherently unreasonable. The
Framers of the Utah Constitution had endured harsh consequences from the use of
falsehoods by government actors, lending even greater force to the protections afforded by
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this section. In light of those same experiences, the Framers also would have intended the
protections of Section 14 to extend to both custodial and non-custodial seizures.
Although its incorrect interpretation of the state constitution requires reversal in
itself, the trial court's ruling is also erroneous because the defendants did not establish as a
matter of law all of the elements of res judicata. There was no "earlier proceeding," the
Jensens' state claims and issues were not finally adjudicated on the merits, and the state
claims and issues are distinct from those decided by the federal court. Additionally, the
policy considerations underlying res judicata are not present, reaffirmed by the federal
court's declination to rule on state claims because of the "important" issues raised.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH CONSTITUTION CONFERS BROADER PROTECTION
THAN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

As noted above, the trial court's application of res judicata was based upon its
conclusion that the Utah Constitution did not afford the Jensens any broader protections
than the United States Constitution (as interpreted by Judge Stewart). Because Judge
Stewart ruled that the federal constitution did not protect the Jensens at all from the
defendants' actions, if this Court concludes that the Utah Constitution does afford such
protections, by necessity its protections are broader than those of its federal counterpart.
A.

State constitutional analysis in general.

In earlier days, disposition of state constitutional claims typically began with an
analysis of federal law, followed by an assessment of whether any reason existed to stray
from whatever federal courts had opined at the time. This variation on the "lockstep"
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theory (in which state constitutions are presumed to have the same scope as their federal
counterpart) was initially endorsed by this Court. See, e.g., State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803,
805-06 (Utah 1986) (recommending analytical process from State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d
233, 236-38 (Vt. 1985)); see also State v. Gunwall, 720 P.3d 808, 811-13 (Wash. 1986).
Over time, state courts began to recognize the inappropriateness of deferring the
construction of their own state's constitution to a court charged with construing a national
constitution. See, e.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 16 (Tex. 1992) ("Our Texas
Forbears surely never contemplated that the fundamental state charter, crafted after years
of rugged experience on the frontier and molded after reflection on the constitutions of
other states, would itself veer in meaning each time the United States Supreme Court
issued a new decision"); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) ("choosing
to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be an
appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts").
A state court construing its own constitution "do[es] not share the strong
limitations perceived by [the U. S. Supreme Court] in its ability to enforce constitutional
protections aggressively. Those limitations arise from the structure of our federal system,
the Court's role as final arbiter of at least the minimum scope of constitutional rights for a
vastly diverse nation, and the Court's lack of familiarity with local conditions." State v.
Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 91 N.J. 338 (1982); see also John W. Shaw, "Principled
Interpretations of State Constitutional Law-Why Don't the Primacy States Practice What
They Preach," 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1028 (1993) (primacy allows tailoring of state
38

constitutional protections to the values of state residents, "rather than enforcing the lowest
common denominator of broadly shared national values").
Factors in state constitutional analysis include: "legislative" history, structural and
textual differences between the state and federal constitutions; whether the subject matter
is of local interest; state history, traditions, and public attitudes; sister state law; and "the
common law, our state's particular . . . traditions, and the intent of our constitution's
drafters." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1013 (Utah 1994); Society of
Separations ts, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n. 6 (Utah 1993); Hunt, supra.
B.

"Legislative" history and intent of the Framers generally.

Relatively little history is available regarding the Declaration of Rights in the 1895
Utah Constitution.

Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 929 ("There was little

discussion or controversy regarding any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights").
Those rights were so fundamental, so uncontroversial, that there was nothing to debate.
Convention delegates knew that noncompliance with Congress's expectations
would put a 40-year quest for statehood at risk. "It is natural, under such circumstances,
for men to proceed with caution." State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457, 52 P. 986, 990 (1898).
Accordingly, the Framers borrowed heavily from the constitutions of other states that had
been approved by Congress. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928 (particularly
Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York).10

See also John J. Flynn, "Federalism and Viable State Government-The History of
Utah's Constitution," 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311 (Illinois, New York, Nevada, Washington,
and Iowa); Paul Wake, Comment, "Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights, and Free
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From that fact, the suggestion has been made that it is difficult to say that the 1895
Constitution was written by Utahns for Utah. See C. Albert Bowers, "Divining the
Framers' Intentions: The Immunity Standard for Criminal Proceedings under the State
Constitution," 2000 UTAH L. REV. 135, 148 (summarizing contention). That does an
injustice to the Framers. Rather than simply copying verbatim from a single constitution,
delegates carefully selected and rejected portions of various documents as suited their
intent. See, e.g., 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention
("Proceedings") at 423 (1898) (B. H. Roberts, questioning adoption of Wyoming's
provision on female suffrage rather than that of Virginia, New York, Ohio, or Indiana);
483 (John Murdock: "I don't wish to refer to what older states have done; they have done
as they pleased, and I hope the people of Utah will do as their best judgment will dictate
to them, and I am not afraid of innovation"); 776 (David Evans: mentioning constitutions
of Kentucky, North Dakota, Maine, Colorado, and California).
Utah's Declaration of Rights is not identical to that in any of the other 44 state
constitutions, copies of which had been provided to delegates. Choosing from among
different options reflects intent, just as a court's choice of quotations from other cases is
no less a statement of its own intent. Moreover, some Framers expressed a view that
Utah was unlike any other state, and that their goal was to be more progressive than other
states. See, e.g., id. at 433-34 (Andrew S. Anderson: urging delegates to "show to the

Government: Do Utahns Remember How to Be Free?" 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661
(Washington); Wallentine, supra (Nevada, Iowa, Illinois, New York and Washington).
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world that Utah is in the advance march of progress and civilization, and in those lifeendearing principles of liberty and justice"); 545 (Andrew Kimball: "the people of Utah
through their circumstances are different to any other people in the United States").
At the time of the 1895 Convention, nearly 90 percent of Utah's population, and
three-quarters of Convention delegates, were members of the LDS Church. Richard D.
Poll, ed., UTAH'S HISTORY (Brigham Young University Press, 1978), p. 393; Society of
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 928. It is thus appropriate to discuss the background and
views of church members at the time of the convention. See id. at 929 n. 31; P. Bobbit,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1984) at 9-11 (relevant history

includes prevailing sentiment at time of adoption).
LDS Church founder Joseph Smith had expressed concern about weak federal
constitutional protections:
The only fault I find with the Constitution is, it is not broad enough to cover the
whole ground. . . . Its sentiments are good, but it provides no means of enforcing
them. It has but this one fault. Under its provision, a man or a people who are
able to protect themselves can get along well enough; but those who have the
misfortune to be weak or unpopular are left to the merciless rage of popular fury.
Larry E. Dahl and Donald Q. Cannon, ed., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOSEPH SMITH'S
TEACHINGS,

p. 144 (quoting Sabbath address, Nauvoo, 15 October 1843).

When it came to basic human liberty, the Framers were unwilling to sacrifice their
principles even at the cost of the great prize. Including women's suffrage in the state
constitution would "dig a grave for statehood," Representative B. H. Roberts warned. 1
Proceedings at 425-28. Such concerns could "go to the dogs," delegates declared. "[I]f
Utah is to be immolated for standing by her principles, for enlarging the borders of
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liberty, let the sacrifice be made, let her be bound upon the altar, let the high priest of
tyranny come forth and plunge the knife into her breast. She cannot perish in a nobler
cause than that of freedom and equal rights." Id. at 738 (Orson F. Whitney); id. at 499
(Alma Eldredge) ("[D]o I want statehood at the sacrifice of honor?").
The Framers of the state constitution did not see their months-long labor as
makework, as it would be if construction of the federal Constitution were dispositive.
They viewed and intended the state constitution to be the supreme, fundamental law of
this state. See id. at 434 (Samuel Thurman); 479-80 (Charles Varian); 502 (Eldredge);
561 (Karl G. Maeser); 572 (Charles Crane); 737 (Whitney); State v. Norman, 16 Utah
457, 52 P. 986, 987 (1898); State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 339 (1904).11
Consistent with that intent, this Court has repeatedly stated that the federal
constitution sets the floor, but not the ceiling, of constitutional protections for Utahns.
Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2005 UT 5, \ 17, 108 P.3d 701; Society of Separationists,
870 P.2d at 940; West, 872 P.2d at 1007 ("Above this floor, states may balance the need
to redress injuries to reputation with guarantees of free expression in a distinct way,
thereby accounting for the unique history, needs, and experiences of their residents").
For these reasons, the lower court should have reviewed the Jensens' state

11

The assumption that the state constitution would provide the primary basis of protection
for Utah residents is reinforced by the fact that, at the time of the Convention, none of the
protections of the Bill of Rights had been applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The first to be applied (takings) was in 1897. Chicago B. & O.R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). First Amendment protections, for example, were not held
applicable to the states until 1925, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); the Fourth
Amendment not until 1949. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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constitutional claims independently of their federal claims. See West, 872 P.2d at 1007
(adopting "primacy" approach in free speech claim under state constitution). That is
particularly true where the family and a state's judicial process are matters of local
interest. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S.Ct. 850 (1890); Hunt, 450 A.2d at 366. In any
event, however, the trial court erred when it ruled that the Utah Constitution did not
afford broader rights to the Jensens than the federal constitution.
There is evidence in the record from which a jury could find that the defendants
(1) made material misrepresentations and omissions in order to remove Parker from his
parents' custody and force chemotherapy upon him; (2) refused to let the Jensens choose
between conflicting recommendations of two licensed physicians {i.e., imposed a
"comparative unfitness" standard) and reported the Jensens when they continued to
request diagnostic testing that all witnesses concede was reasonable; (3) failed to
investigate, by choice, custom, and/or policy, the medical neglect allegations, including
corresponding failures to train and supervise. See Statement of Facts, supra.
From the time of its ratification, this Court has held that the Utah Constitution "is
not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally, and on broad, general
lines, in order that it may accomplish the object of its establishment, and carry out the
great principles of the government." North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah &

See, e.g., pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 (Wagner misrepresentations / omissions), 14,
15, 25 (Cunningham), 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 (Eisenman), 22, 26
(Albritton), 32-33 (imposition of comparative fitness standard by Anderson) 14 (same by
Cunningham), 13, 14, 29, 31, 32 (Cunningham/Anderson's failure and/or policy not to
investigate).
43

Salt Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 P. 824 (1896); Shields v. Toronto, 16 Utah 2d 61,
395 P.2d 829, 830 (1964) (court must "give recognition in the highest possible degree to
all of the rights assured by all of the Constitutional provisions"). In this case, the nature
of the misconduct, the state's common law and legal precedent, the intent of the Framers,
and the history and attitudes of the state, all compel a finding that these actions (if found
by the jury) violated Article I, Sections 1, 7, and 14 of the Utah Constitution.
1.

Article I, § 1 (right to enjoy and defend lives and liberty).

Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All men have the inherent and
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and
protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate
freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
This "inalienable rights" provision has appeared in each version of the state
constitution, beginning with the 1849 Constitution of the State of Deseret ("In Republican
Governments, all men should be bom equally free and independent, and possess certain
natural, essential, and inalienable rights; among which, are those of enjoying and
defending their Life and Liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.").
There is no comparable provision in the U. S. Constitution.

See 1 Bernard

Schwartz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 319, 762-65, 840; Bruce
Kempkes, "The Natural Rights Clause of the Iowa Constitution: When the Law Sits Too
Tight," 42 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 605.) The closest language is in the Fifth Amendment,
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which states, "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . ," but does not mention "inherent and inalienable" rights, or the right
to "defend . . . lives and liberties" recognized in Article I, § 1.
The right to enjoy and defend lives and liberties as guaranteed by a state
constitution "includes the right of privacy, the right to marital privacy and choice . . .
[and] the right to protect one's health."

16A CJ.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 737

(citations omitted); see also Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-149 (Minn. 1988)
(right to make decisions regarding one's health recognized in state constitution has been
rooted in the law "for centuries"); Sojourner v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Services, 177
N.J. 318, 828 A.2d 306, 330 (2003). As articulated by this Court, Article I, § 1
forbids the abridgment by the state of the privileges and immunities of all
citizens. Under its mandate no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, and every person is entitled to the equal
protection of the laws, and may acquire property, possess and protect it, as
well as defend his life and liberty. These are inherent and inalienable rights
of citizens, and are constitutional guaranties.
Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22, 24 (1904); see also Golding v. Schubach
Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871, 875 (1937) ("The Constitution declares in Article I,
§ 1, men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights among
which are the pursuing and obtaining of happiness, and safety, and property.").
"Liberty," as encompassed within Section 1, is "a term of comprehensive scope. It
embraces not only freedom from servitude and from imprisonment and arbitrary restraint
of person, but also all our religious, civil, political, and personal rights[.]" Block, supra,
at 24-25. The right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and as a corresponding
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and accompanying right, the right to privacy in his own home," is a "just claim, God
given, or innate as a human." State v. Kent, 20 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64, 69 (1964). In this
case, each type of alleged misconduct (misrepresentations and omissions, imposition of a
comparative fitness standard / refusal to permit reasonably requested testing, and failure
to investigate medical neglect allegations) are protected by Section 1.
a.

Misrepresentations and omissions

It has long been recognized that interference with fundamental rights by a state
actor employing material misrepresentations or omissions is wrongful. See, e.g., Meyer v.
Board of County Commissioners of Harper County, 482 F.3d 1232, 1243 (10th Cir.
2007); Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 691-692 (10th Cir. 1990); Malik v. Arapahoe
County Dept of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 1999); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359
F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004), and cases cited; see also Merchants' Nat. Bank of
Kansas City v. Robison, 8 Utah 256, 30 P. 985 (1892) (person who signs a certificate of
stock containing false information is liable; "[t]hese views are so fundamental, and so
consonant with honesty and fair dealing, that they need no authority in their support").
This proposition is self-evident, because interference with fundamental rights can
be justified only if a state actor proves that his actions were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest. See, e.g., Thurnwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38,ffi[28, 35, 163 P.3d
623. There can never be a compelling need to intentionally or recklessly fabricate, omit,
or distort evidence in order to take someone's child and force potentially unneeded
medical treatment on him, or to obtain warrants or other judicial orders, nor can such
conduct be "narrowly tailored." See, e.g., P.J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, et al, 2006
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WL 1702585 ** 10, 16, 19 (J. Cassell, 2006) (state actor may not "threaten the Jensens,
refuse to perform confirmatory tests, or make false, incomplete, or misleading statements
to Utah courts[.]").
b.

Refusal to allow parents to choose between licensed
physicians or to seek reasonably requested testing.

Section 1 is implicated when a subject is prevented from exercising the rights
guaranteed by it. See, e.g., Golding, 70 P.2d at 875 (Section 1 rights "are invaded when
one is not at liberty to contract with others respecting the use to which he may subject his
property (or use or employ his time or talents), or the manner in which he may enjoy it").
As noted above, the rights guaranteed by Section 1 include the right to make
decisions regarding personal health or, in this case, to make decisions for one's child.
Defendants Anderson and Cunningham interfered with these rights by requiring the
Jensens to follow the recommendations of the reporting doctor, rather than a licensed
physician of their own choice (who, incidentally, turned out to be right). Not only is there
no compelling state interest in forcing a parent to use a particular doctor, but the
unconstitutionality of such interference is widely recognized. (To avoid duplication, the
discussion of comparative fitness at pp. 50-56, infra, is incorporated herein.) Similarly,
Wagner, interfered with the Jensens' rights by refusing to perform reasonably requested
diagnostic testing, and reporting the Jensens for medical neglect when they continued to
insist on such testing before starting chemotherapy.13

Whether Wagner felt that such testing was necessary is immaterial, as all witnesses in
the case agree that it was a reasonable request by the parents. The federal court (J.
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c.

Failure / refusal to investigate

Finally, Cunningham's (and Anderson's) failure to investigate medical neglect
allegations also violates Section 1. With apologies for the double negative, there is no
compelling state interest in not investigating allegations of parental neglect before
curtailing a parent's liberty by making such allegations. Indeed, state statutes expressly
required Cunningham to investigate - to at least ask the parents - even in a so-called
emergency. Choosing not to do so violated Section 1 on its face.
2.

Article I, § 7 (due process)

Article I, § 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." This due process clause, the wording of which is similar to
that in the federal constitution, affords two types of constitutional protections. First, it
guarantees substantive due process rights, Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d
199, 204 (Utah 1984), including "the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain
parental ties to his or her child[.]" In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982); see also In the
Matter of the Adoption ofB.B.D., 1999 UT 70, f 10, 984 P.2d 967.
Interference with these rights is subject to strict scrutiny: a governmental actor
must establish the means utilized are "narrowly tailored" to achieve "a compelling state
interest." Wells, 681 P.2d at 206-07; Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38,ffl[28, 35. See also Jones

Cassell) held that a refusal by a state actor to perform confirmatory tests reasonably
requested by a parent states a claim for violation of the right to familial association and
procedural and substantive due process. P. J. ex rel Jensen v. State of Utah, et al., 2006
WL 1702585 **10, 16, 18-19, which would be particularly true if a jury found that
Wagner did so in order to meet a timetable for a clinical trial.
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v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191 (1923) (recognizing similar right of children in
familial association).
Section 7 also affords procedural rights, "notably, notice and opportunity to be
heard, which must be observed in order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty,
or property." Wells, 681 P.2d at 204 (citations omitted). "The general test for the validity
of such rules, the test of procedural due process, is fairness." Id.
Although this Court has construed the state and federal due process clauses as
substantially the same in some contexts, see, e.g., Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,1} 11, 52
P.3d 1158, that "does not indicate that this court moves in 'lockstep with the United
States Supreme Court's due process analysis or foreclose our ability to decide in the
future that our state constitutional provisions afford more rights than the federal
Constitution." Id. Indeed, at the time of the Constitution's adoption, the Court observed
that the two due process clauses are not co-extensive:
The constitution of the United States cannot, as to the states, be held to be
the sole unbending rule as to the method of procedure, when dealing with
the life, liberty, and property of individuals in the several states. Such a
rule would deprive the states of their right to regulate its procedure, laws,
and rules of practice in their own courts, so as to protect life, liberty, and
property by such due process of law as should be enacted with reference to
the constitution of the United States which was framed for an undefined
and expanding future, and for people gathered, and to be gathered, from
many nations and many tongues.
In re McKee, 19 Utah 231, 57 P. 23, 26-27 (1899); State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935, 2008
UT 83, f 24 ("While the text of the two provisions is identical, we do not presume that
federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the meaning of
identical provisions in the Utah Constitution. In fact, we have not hesitated to interpret
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the provisions of the Utah Constitution to provide more expansive protections than
similar federal provisions where appropriate.")(internal citations omitted).
a*

Misrepresentations and omissions.

The making of misrepresentations and omissions by a state actor is a violation of
both forms of due process. As this Court recognized in Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687,
690 (Utah 1981), "[I]t is an accepted premise in American jurisprudence that any
conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair and
totally incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice.'" That principle applies
equally to the use of such tactics to interfere with the parent-child relationship. See also
p. 46-47, supra.14
b.

Refusal to allow the Jensens to choose their own physician
or to conduct reasonably requested tests.

As noted above, defendant Anderson admits taking the position that, if a parent's
licensed physician had a different medical opinion than a licensed physician consulted by
the State, the parent did not get to choose. Defendant Cunningham admits this also, in a
different way: She admits that she did not consider allowing the Jensens to rely on Dr.
Moore's recommendations because the person accusing the Jensens of medical neglect
told her that Dr. Moore was not qualified to care for Parker. By disqualifying a physician

It is for this reason that collateral estoppel cannot be based upon rulings tainted by
fraud. Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, 107 (1926); Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54
Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 327-28 (1919) (conviction procured through "perjury, fraud, or
other undue means" is "worthless" to show probable cause in malicious prosecution suit);
see also Pierce, supra, 359 F.3d at 1292 (prohibition against misrepresentations is known
and obvious).
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solely on the say-so of a reporting doctor, Cunningham de facto imposed her choice of
physicians on the Jensens.
Particularly when viewed in light of the common law, this Court's precedent, the
history of the state and the intent of Convention delegates, these admitted actions of
Anderson and Cunningham plainly violated the Jensens' state constitutional rights.
Under the common law, no relationship was afforded greater protection than that of
parent and child. A right that has "strong roots in the common law" suggests greater
protection under the state constitution. West, 872 P.2d at 1013; see also Utah Code Ann.
§ 62A-4a-201(l) (2003) ("The right of a fit, competent parent to raise his child has long
been protected by the laws and Constitution of this state and of the United States.");
American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 2006 UT 40, f 43, 48 (the
Framers intended that the common law be employed to interpret the state constitution);
Deseretlrr. Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah 398, 52 P. 628, 629 (1898) (same).
Unlike any other state in the West, "Utah was settled primarily by two-parent
families . . . ." Carrie Hillyard, "The History of Suffrage and Equal Rights Provisions in
State Constitutions," 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 122 (1996). At the time of the constitution,
Utah recognized a presumption that a parent will fulfill his duties
by reason of the love and affection he holds for his offspring and out of regard
for the child's future welfare. . . . Indeed, the common law based the right of
the father to have custody and dominion over the person of his child upon the
ground that he might better discharge the duty he owed the child and the state
in respect to the care, nurture, and education of the child. Before the state can
be substituted to the right of the parent it must affirmatively be made to appear
that the parent has forfeited his natural and legal right to the custody and
control of the child by reason of his failure, inability, neglect, or incompetency
to discharge the duty and thus to enjoy the right.
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Mill v. Brown, 88 P. 609, 613 (Utah 1907); see also 2 Proceedings at 450 (Richards: "In
the brute world we find the mother's love for offspring more strong than the instinct for
self preservation. This is an unfailing passion throughout the whole course of organic
life, whether brute or human").
Prior to ratification of the constitution, a child could be removed from the home in
Utah only upon a showing of his parent's "habitual intemperance, and vicious and brutal
conduct, or from vicious, brutal and criminal conduct towards said minor child." Laws
1851 to 1870, Chapter XVII, § 9. This standard was re-enacted by the first state
legislature, Rev. Stat. 1898, Title 3, § 82, indicating that it was consistent with the
Framers' intent. P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1147
(Utah 1988) (noting that many of the first legislators were convention delegates); Salt
Lake City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 526 (1908) (reenactment of statute is
evidence that framers intended the law to remain as it was).
In Washington, to which the Framers looked when drafting the 1895 Constitution,
the supreme court had reaffirmed a year earlier the principle that a child can be removed
from a home only if the parents are affirmatively unfit, not merely because the state
would prefer they make different choices. Lovell v. House of the Good Shepherd, 9
Wash. 419, 37 P. 660, 661 (1894) ("courts must exercise great charity and forbearance for
the opinions, methods, and practices of all different classes of society; and a case should
be made out which is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong to meet the
condemnation of all decent and law-abiding people, without regard to religious belief or
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social standing, before a parent should be deprived of the comfort or custody of a child").
Consistent with common law and statutory history, this Court held long ago that, to
be constitutional, removal of a child from his parent's custody requires an affirmative
showing of unfitness. Mill, 88 P. at 613; Cooke v. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83 (1926)
("[T]he unfitness which deprives a parent of the right to the custody of the child must be
positive and not merely comparative, or merely speculative"); In re B.R., et al, 2006 UT
App 354, \ 87, 144 P.3d 231 (under Utah Constitution, "a parent is entitled to a showing
of unfitness, abandonment, or substantial neglect before his or her parent rights are
terminated"), rev'don other grounds, In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 171 P.3d435.
It is thus long settled that state actors cannot interfere with a parent's choice
between licensed medical practitioners merely because they think one physician is
"better" than the other, or because there is a conflict in medical opinion between the two.
See, e.g., In the Matter ofHojbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (1979) (The analysis of a
parent's rights to direct medical care "cannot be posed in terms of whether the parent has
made a 'right' or a 'wrong' decision, for the present state of the practice of medicine,
despite its vast advances, very seldom permits such definitive conclusions. . . . Rather, in
our view, the court's inquiry should be whether the parents, once having sought
accredited medical assistance and having been made aware of the seriousness of their
child's affliction and the possibility of cure if a certain mode of treatment is undertaken,
have provided for their child a treatment which is recommended by their physician and
which has not been totally rejected by all responsible medical authority."); State v.
Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962) (parents rejecting for religious reasons unanimous
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medical opinion as to need for blood transfusions; "[h]ad there been a relevant and
substantial difference of medical opinion about the efficacy of the proposed treatment or
if there were substantial evidence that the treatment itself posed a significant danger to
the infant's life, a strong argument could be made in favor of appellants' position"); In re
CFB, 497 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. App. 1973) (clinic's report of neglect for mother's
withdrawal of child as patient was baseless; "Whether the mother's reasons for that
dissatisfaction [with the clinic] were correct or incorrect is not the point. The mother had
a right to choose between different doctors or institutions for the purpose of this type of
care. So long as the mother was willing and intended to provide appropriate care in some
manner, no finding can stand that she was guilty of neglecting the child"); In re Tony
Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561, *3 (Pa. Q. 1912) (court could not substitute its medical
judgment for that of parents absent showing of unfitness; even if defective judgment were
a basis for superseding parents' decision, neglect was not shown where "the science of
medicine and surgery, notwithstanding its enormous advances, has not yet been able to
insure an absolutely correct diagnosis in all cases, and still less an absolutely correct
prognosis"). Cf. Custody of a Minor, 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Mass. 1978) ("no
dispute" as to diagnosis and need for chemotherapy; emphasizing that parent's refusal
"was not based on the parents' view that another medically effective form of treatment
could be found," but merely upon 'hope' of child's recovery).
Utah's constitutional framers would have been especially concerned about this
aspect of Anderson and Cunningham's conduct. For decades, LDS Church members had
experienced what they viewed as persecution by a government intent on imposing its own
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values on the Mormon family structure, culminating in the famed polygamy prosecutions.
See State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, ^f 32, 996 P.2d 546 (mentioning prosecutions in
construing Section 7).
"[M]any of Utah's constitutional convention delegates had either been pursued
by federal authorities or were well acquainted with people who had. Because
of widespread newspaper coverage, the vast majority of Utah's population was
aware of the prosecutions, and the delegates to the constitutional convention
had an intimate awareness of the problems posed by systematic oppression by
the federal government. . . . Prior to becoming a state, the framers of the Utah
Constitution suffered heavily at the hands of the federal government. These
memories were fresh in the minds of the framers
"
Bowers, supra, 2000 UTAH L. REV. at 151, 169.
The anti-polygamy campaign was directed at the disruption of families. Fathers,
mothers, and sometimes children were imprisoned. Children were left without support
when their parents were jailed or forced into hiding. Conditions were harsh for those
targeted by the government. See Martha S. Bradley, "'Hide and Seek': Children on the
Underground," 51 UTAH HISTORICAL QUARTERLY (1953), pp. 133-153.
In 1882, as such deprivations were on the rise, a new provision was added to the
state's draft constitution, declaring that "The blessings of free government can only be
maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue,
and frequent recurrence to fundamental principles." This language was restated in the
1887 version. Significantly, when its inclusion was questioned in 1895, Heber Wells
stated the committee's view that it was needed in light of abuses "in the past." 1
Proceedings at 362.
That the Framers would have been repulsed by a state actor forcing a specific
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health care provider on a parent is further supported by the writings of the Hon. Thomas
Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, considered "the foremost constitutional authority
in the world, perhaps," by the drafters. 1 Proceedings at 447 (Richards), 464 (Roberts), II
Proceedings at 1739 (Evans); American Bush, 2008 UT 40 atffi[13, 49 n.16, 51.
In Van Deusen v. Newcomer, 40 Mich. 90, 128 (1878), Judge Cooley had
concurred in ordering a new trial regarding a patient whose family had committed her to
an insane asylum, stating: "I cannot admit that because one is a practitioner of medicine,
it is therefore proper or safe to suffer him to decide upon mental disease, and consign
people to the asylum upon his judgment or certificate." If "differences of opinion among
those who are called to give scientific evidence" exist, he wrote, it would be intolerable
for the patient's fate to hinge on whether "one physician rather than another happened to
be called in as the adviser." Id. at 132.
Cunningham and Anderson's requirement that the Jensens follow the
recommendations of Wagner (and, later, a board-certified pediatric oncologist in this
country) instead of a licensed physician of their choosing thus violated Section 7 rights.
Additionally, as discussed above, the Jensens had a right to request reasonable diagnostic
testing, regardless of whether Dr. Wagner felt a need for it. Accordingly, Wagner's
actions in reporting the Jensens to DCFS when they refused to commence chemotherapy
without such testing violated their rights under Section 7.
c.

Failure to investigate

The third type of state action evidenced by the record, Cunningham's failure to
investigate medical neglect allegations (and Anderson's policy or practice permitting it)
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also violated Section 7 rights. These rights require that the subject of a judicial or
administrative proceeding receive an opportunity to be heard "in a meaningful way."
Worthen v. Buckley, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996).
No argument is, or can be, made that the Jensens had any opportunity to be heard
in the DCFS proceeding before DCFS accused the Jensens of medical neglect and sought
custody of Parker. Cunningham cannot claim that she did not know how to give the
Jensens this opportunity. Aside from common sense (pick up a phone), state statute
spelled it out for her. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ U.C.A. § 62A-4a-409(l)(a) (2003)
(requiring, inter alia, a "thorough investigation," UTAH ADMIN. R. 512-201-1 & -201-4
(2003) (outlining required investigation). If Wagner indeed told her that it was an
emergency, then Cunningham knew she had to at least ask the parents for their side of the
story before seeking to remove their son from their custody. See p. 13-14, supra.
Cunningham admits that none of this was done, by which the Jensens' Section 7 rights
were violated as a matter of law.
3.

Article I, Section 14 (search and seizure)

Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution states: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation . . . ." This right is "'the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men' that demands an
independent and proper judicial determination." DeBooy, supra, 2000 UT 32, \ 32.
On several occasions, this Court has found the protections afforded by Section 14
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to be greater than those afforded by the similarly worded Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See, e.g., id., ^J 12; State v. Larocco, 19 A P.2d 460 (Utah
1990); see also Bowers, supra at 147 ("several unique facets of Utah's history" suggest
that state constitutional requirements for testimonial immunity do not mirror the federal).
"Mormon delegates likely viewed the territorial government-controlled by
federally appointed non-Mormons-as oppressive. They had experienced the attempted
control and suppression of their religious beliefs and practices by the federal government,
often operating through territorial officials. . . . Both groups of delegates could claim that
some form of authority, be it federal or local, had denied them freedom of conscience,
and both were acutely aware of the threat government power presented to that freedom."
Society of Separationsts, 870 P.2d at 935.
The employment of falsehoods by government officials, as alleged here, would
have been uniquely disturbing to Utah's Framers. From their perspective, LDS Church
members had suffered extraordinary harm as the result of false testimony. In 1838, for
example, Missouri governor Lilburn Boggs issued the notorious "extermination" order
expelling Mormons from the state three days after the execution of a false affidavit by
Thomas B. Marsh and Orson Hyde that claimed, among other things, that Joseph Smith
intended to conquer the United States. Gary J. Bergera, "The Personal Cost of the 1838
Mormon War in Missouri: One Mormon's Plea for Forgiveness," MORMON HISTORICAL
STUDIES

(Spring 2003), p. 139. A month later, Missouri officials used the affidavit as a

basis to jail Smith for treason. Id.
Seven years later, Smith was again pursued by government officials, this time in
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Illinois. In reliance upon a promise of security by Governor Ford, Smith and other
Mormon leaders voluntarily surrendered. Instead, Smith and his brother Hyrum were
allowed to be murdered in their jail cell in Nauvoo. See Whitney, HISTORY OF UTAH,
Vol. 1, pp. 228-30; The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, HISTORY OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS

(Deseret News: 1932), Vol. VII, p.

172 (Smith was arrested through "false pretense").
In 1857, William Drummond, an appointee to the territorial supreme court, falsely
reported to the attorney general that Brigham Young had murdered territorial leaders, and
that the Mormons had burned territorial records and committed treason. See Andrew L.
Neff, History of Utah (ed. Leland H. Creer, Salt Lake City: Deseret News, 1940), Vol. 1,
pp. 448-51. President Buchanan, with whom church leaders were already at strife, cited
Drummond's assertions as evidence that the Mormons were in rebellion, and dispatched
the Army to Utah to replace Young as governor by force. Id.
Young issued a proclamation decrying, again, deception by government officials:
"For the last twenty five years we have trusted officials of the Government, from
Constables and Justices to Judges, Governors, and Presidents, only to be scorned, held in
derision, insulted and betrayed." Proclamation, August 5, 1857; id. ("We know these
aspersions are false, but that avails us nothing"). More than 30,000 Mormons evacuated
northern Utah in anticipation of invading forces. Hubert Howe Bancroft, HISTORY OF
UTAH

1540-1886 (San Francisco, The History Company: 1889), p. 535.
In 1871, Brigham Young was indicted by territorial officials for an 1857 murder

based upon the false affidavit of a man named William Hickman, who was "in collusion
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with the crusading officials to bring trouble upon his former brethren."
HISTORY OF UTAH,

Whitney,

pp. 629-640. Young was denied bail and spent four months under

house arrest; two of his alleged co-conspirators spent six months in jail. Bancroft, pp.
663-64.
Apart from the Framers' intent, there is a more basic reason why Section 14
protected the Jensens from the defendants' actions: By its plain language, Section 14
prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and the issuance of warrants not based
upon oath or affirmation.

The use of material misrepresentations and omissions to

effectuate a seizure is inherently unreasonable. Similarly, obtaining a warrant or court
order through false oath or affirmation cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 14.
The federal court rejected the Jensens' argument that non-custodial (non-physical)
seizures are encompassed within the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution, but
there is no question that Section 14's protections extend to such seizures. Indeed, if there
is one state where that would be true, it is Utah.
A custodial seizure is, as the term suggests, a physical restraint of liberty. Daren
Jensen underwent a custodial seizure when he was arrested and incarcerated in Idaho in
August 2003, and Barbara and Daren Jensen were both seized when they were booked
and released in Utah in September 2003.
A non-custodial seizure is one that results from state-imposed conditions that
significantly, but not physically, restrict liberty. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
278, 114 S.Ct. 807 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (a citizen may be subject to state
imposed conditions that restrict liberty, including conditions of bail, mandatory court
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appearances, restrictions on freedom to travel, diminishment of employment prospects,
reputational harm, and "the financial and emotional strain of preparing a defense." See
also id. at 307 (Justices Souter and Stevens concurring in Justice Ginsberg's view of
continuing seizure).
The Framers unquestionably had such seizures in mind when they adopted Article
I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. Many members of the Church had been forced into
hiding or to abandon their families during the 1880s, which was no less an infringement
of their physical liberty than an arrest. (LDS Church President John Taylor had died
while in hiding in 1887, less than a decade before the constitution was adopted.) The
Framers were very aware that a deprivation of freedom by the government can take forms
beyond physical restraint.
In this case, the Jensens were unable to return to their home state without the
threat of arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for an
evaluation in Houston, or to other physicians of their choosing. They were subjected to
mandatory court appearances. They were ordered to give up their passports. Daren
Jensen lost his job, and was exposed to diminishment of other employment prospects,
both because he was terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his
time, finances, energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights. The
Jensens were held up to public ridicule and contempt, and subjected to media scrutiny.
These facts rise to the level of a seizure under Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

See also Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 945 (2nd Cir. 1997) (post-

arraignment order prohibiting an arrestee from leaving the State of New York and
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requiring that he attend court appointments amounted to a "seizure" under Fourth
Amendment); Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir.1999) (overruled on other
grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir.2003)) (holding that a plaintiff
had alleged Fourth Amendment seizure where, in addition to being summoned to appear
and answer to charges, plaintiff was forced to sign personal recognizance bond, and was
required to report regularly to pretrial services and obtain permission before leaving the
state); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3rd Cir.1998) (finding seizure
where plaintiff was required to post $10,000 bond, attend all court hearings, maintain
weekly contact with pretrial services, and refrain from traveling outside New Jersey and
Pennsylvania); Sassower v. City of White Plains, 992 F.Supp. 652, 656 (S.D.N.Y.1998).
II.

RES JUDICATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE JENSENS'
STATE CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL REASONS,

Res judicata is an affirmative defense, and thus the defendants bore the burden of
proving that each of the elements was present as a matter of law. 77mm v. Dewsnup, 851
P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993). Apart from the trial court's error in concluding that the
state constitution did not afford broader protections than the federal, addressed supra, the
trial court's application of res judicata was error for additional reasons.
"[R]es judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion."
Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 1999 UT 39, \ 15, 982 P.2d 65. In their motions
below, the defendants argued that the Jensens' state claims were barred under both
prongs. In ruling that "res judicata" applied, the trial court did not identify a particular
branch; accordingly, both are addressed.
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A.

Claim preclusion does not apply.

"In general terms, claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent
action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Brigham Young University v.
Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678. When a party seeks the application
of claim preclusion based upon a prior federal judgment, Utah courts apply federal res
judicata law. See Massey v. Board of Trustees ofOgden Area Community Action Comm.,
2004 UT App 27,ffl[6-7, 86 P.3d 120.
Under federal law, claim preclusion applies only if the party asserting the doctrine
establishes three elements: "(1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2)
identity of parties or privies in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of action in both
suits." Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. (Utah) 2008). One or more of those
elements is not present in this case.
1.

There was no earlier action.

Claim preclusion looks to the causes of action that were filed in an earlier
proceeding. Pelt, supra, at 1281; Oman, 2008 UT 70,1f 31. Here, there was no "earlier
proceeding." All of the claims were filed in the same lawsuit in the same court at the
same time. Defendants' removal of the case to federal court did not convert this single
case into two cases. See Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.
1998) ("this situation does not involve two separate lawsuits, one in state court and
another in federal court. Rather, it involves one suit that originated in state court and that
was removed to federal court."); Mcllravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031
(10th Cir. 2000) ("Res judicata does not speak to direct attacks in the same case, but
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rather has application in subsequent actions.")
2.

There was no "final judgment on the merits" on the Jensens'
state law claims.

Res judicata does not apply if a court dismissed prior claims for want of
jurisdiction, or other grounds not going to the merits. Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall.
232, 71 U.S. 232, 18 L.Ed. 303 (1866); Park Lake Res. Ltd Liab. Co. v. USDA, 378 F .3d
1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2004); Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325, 2003 UT
12, ^[ 36 (where a federal court dismisses a plaintiffs state constitutional and common
law claims without prejudice and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, neither
claim or issue preclusion applies). In this case, the federal court went out of its way not
to rule on the Jensens' state law claims, which it said included "important" state
constitutional issues that should be decided by a state court.
3,

The Jensens' state claims are separate and distinct from the
claims ruled upon by the federal court

The appellees argued below that, because the Jensens rely on the same underlying
facts to support their claims under the Utah Constitution as were relied upon in federal
court, their state and federal claims must be identical, warranting the application of claim
preclusion to the state claims. However, the Jensens have demonstrated how and why the
lights afforded in the Utah Constitution protected them from the alleged misconduct,
which necessarily distinguishes the claims from those under the federal constitution (as
construed by Judge Stewart, who found no protection under the latter). See pp. 37-62,
supra. (Additionally, the federal court did not purport to address the Jensens' state
common law claims, which are inherently distinct from constitutional claims.)
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4.

The policy justifications behind the doctrine of claim preclusion
are not present in this case.

"The fundamental policies underlying the doctrine of res judicata (or claim
preclusion) are finality, judicial economy, preventing repetitive litigation and forumshopping, and 'the interest in bringing litigation to an end.'" Plotner v. AT & TCorp., 224
F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2000). These policies are not implicated in this case. First, any
policy related to finality is not implicated by the procedural stance of this case, because
the Jensens' state law claims have been pending since the inception of the case, and have
never been ruled upon by any court.
Nor is judicial economy at risk. The Jensens do not seek to waste judicial
resources; they ask only for their day in court on their state law claims. No judicial
energy was expended on the state law claims by the federal court, as the claims were not
addressed. As to the policy of preventing repetitive litigation and forum shopping, the
Jensens have filed only one action in one court. It was not the Jensens who removed this
case to federal court (a tactic more akin to "forum shopping"), but the defendants.
Finally, the policy related to "bringing litigation to an end" is inapplicable here, because
the Jensens' state law claims have been pending since the inception of this case, and were
never considered by the federal court.
B.

Issue preclusion

Defendants also argued below that the second prong of res judicata, issue
preclusion, barred the Jensens' state claims. "Collateral estoppel, or, in modern usage,
issue preclusion, 'means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
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determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit.'" Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S.Ct. 783,
127 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). Again, however, this component of res judicata does not apply
because there is no "future lawsuit"; it is the same case in which the claims were
originally filed.
The elements of issue preclusion would not be met in any event. As noted earlier,
federal res judicata law applies if a party is attempting to bind a state court to a federal
court ruling. Under Tenth Circuit law, a party arguing issue preclusion must establish
four elements as a matter of law:
(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the
action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the
merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in
privity with a party, to the prior adjudication, and (4) the party against
whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the prior action.
Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2006).
1.

The issues presented for review in this action are not identical to
the issues decided by the federal court.

The legal issues before this Court are different than the legal issues considered and
applied in the federal court proceeding. The federal court applied federal law of absolute
immunity, qualified immunity, substantive and procedural due process under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and malicious prosecution under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Here, this Court is applying
state law, including Article I, Sections 1, 7 and 14 of the Utah Constitution, and the
common law of this state applicable to intentional infliction of emotional distress and
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wrongful initiation of civil and criminal process.
Furthermore, the factual issues that were considered by the federal court are not
identical to the issues in the state claims. Factual issues are necessarily measured by
reference to legal standards. In other words, without reference to a law or legal standard,
it is impossible for a Court to determine whether a particular fact is material or not. (For
example, a statement might be material to a claim for defamation, while immaterial to a
claim for breach of contract.) When dealing with causes of action arising under a distinct
legal theory and source of right, the factual issues implicated are likewise distinct.
The trial court also should not defer to federal court rulings that would be
impermissible in state court. Under Utah law, for example, a party's intent is generally
regarded as an issue of fact. See, e.g., Lysenko v. Sawaya, 7 P.3d 783, 2000 UT 58, f 17;
see also IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 196 P.3d 588, 2008 UT
73, \ 18 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted) (state court may not grant summary judgment "if
the facts shown by the evidence on a summary judgment motion support more than one
plausible but conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case . . . particularly if the
issue turns on credibility or if the inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent.").
Thus, for example, the federal court's findings that misrepresentations by
defendants Wagner and Cunningham were not made "deliberately" (see, e.g., Exh. 3 at
38, 40, 46, 52, 55) would be impermissible on summary judgment in state court. (That
finding also did not address the Jensens' alternative argument that the misrepresentations
were made recklessly.)
Similarly, the federal court's finding that one or more of the defendants acted
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"reasonably" as a matter of law (see, e.g., Exh. 3 at 38, 42) is inconsistent with Utah law,
under which "questions of reasonableness necessarily pose questions of fact which should
be reserved for jury resolution." Ilott v. University of Utah, 2000 UT App 286, ^f 18, 12
P.3d 1011, citing Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727-28 (Utah 1985).
The federal court's factual findings improperly resolved credibility issues in favor
of the defendants, and construed evidence in favor of the moving party. For example, the
district court made a finding of fact that "Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully
attempted to schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation" (Exh. 3 at 6), when both
Dr. Corwin and Daren Jensen testified that they had scheduled a meeting, but that Dr.
Wagner nixed it. See p. 12, supra. This finding is important because, not only does it
imply that the Jensens were unwilling to have further discussions about PJ's situation, but
this meeting would have been an opportunity for the Jensens to explain their position to
the DCFS liaison (who was operating under an erroneous assumption that Wagner had
run all available confirmatory testing), and potentially for Dr. Moore to explain her
questions about the diagnosis.
Another example of the federal court construing evidence in a light most favorable
to the defendants is observed in its acknowledgement that fresh tissue was available in
Parker's mouth for new testing, followed by: "However, this would have required further
surgery to obtain a sample." (Exh. 3 at 4). This characterization reflects an effort to
excuse Dr. Wagner's unprecedented refusal to seek such testing, ignores Dr. Albritton's
testimony that removing the remaining tissue would have alleviated her concerns that the
tumor might spread, exaggerates the minor outpatient procedure of snipping additional
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tissue, and downplays the alternative that might be avoided (45 weeks of chemotherapy).
See p. 8, supra.

The federal court's ruling is replete with such defense-friendly

characterizations, which would be improper in state court on summary judgment.
2.

The "prior action" was not "finally adjudicated on the merits."

As discussed above, there was no "prior action" but rather a single case, so this
threshold element of issue preclusion fails.

Moreover, again there was no final

adjudication on the merits, at least with respect to plaintiffs' state law claims, because the
federal court never reached those claims.
3.

Policy considerations militate against applying the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.

The Tenth Circuit recognizes that in certain instances issue preclusion should not
be applied, for example, where the application of issue preclusion "would 'do[ ] nothing
to vindicate two primary policies behind the doctrine, conserving judicial resources and
protecting parties from 'the expense and vexation' of relitigating issues that another party
previously has litigated and lost."' Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian
Gaming Com% 327 F.3d 1019, 1030 (10th Cir. 2003).
In addition, this Court has recognized that "collateral estoppel can yield an unjust
outcome if applied without reasonable consideration and due care." Buckner v. Kennard,
2004 UT 78, TI 15, 99 P.3d 842. Accordingly, courts "must carefully consider whether
granting preclusive effect to a prior decision is appropriate.... Collateral estoppel 'is not
an inflexible, universally applicable principle[.] . . . Policy considerations may limit its
use where . . . the underpinnings of the doctrine are outweighed by other factors.' " Id.
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(alterations in original) (citation omitted).
Such policy considerations are present in this case. The Utah Constitution is the
"supreme law" of the state of Utah. Under the primacy approach, this Court typically
examines state constitutional issues first, and considers federal law of no more persuasive
weight than case law from a sister state. State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106, 2007 UT 49
If 33; State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397, 2007 UT 47, f 15. Deferring to a federal court is
detrimental to, not consistent with, state policy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellants respectfully request the Court
reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s p y ^ day of August, 2009.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

(foM 0
Roger P. Christens
Karra J. Porter
Sarah E. Spencer
Attorneys for Appellants
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Exhibit 1

Memorandum Decision, February 18, 2009

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL pi$T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
FEBW/W*B
THIRD D&TWCT C G U ^
SALT LAKE DEPARTM^i

BARBARA JENSEN et al.,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 050912502

vs.

Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.
STATE OF UTAH; et al.,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant
Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Wagner and
Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Eiseman's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court heard oral argument with

respect to the motions on January 26, 2009.

Following the

hearing, the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda,
arguments of counsel, as well as the decision of Judge Stewart,
finds it clear that Plaintiffs have pled the same factual basis
for their Causes of Action and further, that all the claims arise
from a single set of operative events.

Indeed, the factual

events pled in the instant mirror those which supported
Plaintiffs' federal claims.

Moreover, Judge Stewart,

after an

extensive analysis of the facts, made findings and conclusions
based on the issues underlying Plaintiffs' claims.

. \ i s\ s\
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The aforementioned in mind, the Utah Supreme Court in the
similar case of Oman v.

Davis

Sch.

Dist.,

2008 UT 70, (Utah 2008)

stated the following:
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two
distinct theories: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78,
P 12, 99 P.3d 842. This appeal raises only
the latter principle of issue preclusion.
Issue preclusion, which is also known as
collateral estoppel, "prevents parties or
their privies from relitigating facts and
issues in the second suit that were fully
litigated in the first suit." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The purposes of
issue preclusion include "(1) preserving the
integrity of the judicial system by
preventing inconsistent judicial outcomes,(2) promoting judicial economy by preventing
previously litigated issues from being
relitigated; and (3) protecting litigants
from harassment by vexatious litigation." Id.
P 14.

Id.

at P28.
The Oman court continued stating:
Issue preclusion applies only when the
following four elements are met: (I) the
party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted must have been a party to or in
privity with a party to the prior
adjudication; (ii) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must be identical to the
one presented in the instant action; (iii)
the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and
(iv) the first suit must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits. Collins v.
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, P
12, 52 P.3d 1267 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

JENSEN v. STATE OF UTAH

Id.

Page 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

at P29.
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, there

can be no question each of the elements has been satisfied.
While Plaintiffs argue there was no final adjudication on the
merits because the federal court never reached the state law
claims, a review of Plaintiffs' Complaint and the federal court's
Memorandum Decision demonstrates that the factual contentions and
issues supporting the state claims are identical to those
underlying the federal claims and were necessary to Judge
Stewart's decision.

Indeed, in response to a similar argument by

the plaintiff in Oman regarding his breach of contract claim, the
Court stated:
Underlying the § 1983 claim was the
dispositive issue of whether the District
breached the Classified Agreement when it
fired Oman for cause. Indeed, when Oman filed
his complaint in federal court, his basis for
the § 1983 cause of action was twofold: (1)
that the District's "pre-termination conduct
deprived him of due process rights secured by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution," and (2) that the
District's "decision to suspend, and later
terminate, his employment violated the terms
of the Classified Agreement." Thus, a
resolution of the § 1983 claim, as framed by
Oman, required the federal court to resolve
the underlying issue of whether the District
violated the Classified Agreement when it
fired Oman. The issue was squarely before the
federal court, was litigated by the parties,
and was necessary to the court's final
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judgment on the § 1983 claim. Accordingly,
the federal court made findings and
conclusions regarding the alleged breach of
contract--including the previously quoted
conclusion that the District had a sufficient
basis for firing Oman for cause under the
Classified Agreement--and these findings and
conclusions are binding in subsequent actions
under the doctrine of issue preclusion.
Although Oman's breach of contract claim was
not litigated in the federal court, it is
based upon the same underlying issue that was
resolved by the federal court: whether the
District had a sufficient basis for
terminating Oman for cause under the
Classified Agreement. The state district
court was therefore bound by the federal
court's conclusion that "[Oman] ' s
representations to the District regarding his
work hours provided a sufficient basis for
termination for cause." Accordingly, even if
Oman had argued to the district court that
his conduct did not give the District a basis
for terminating him for cause, the argument
would have failed based on the federal
court's prior ruling.
Id.

at P33.
As noted, the issues in this case arise from a single,

distinct set of events and as demonstrated by the Memorandum
Decision of Judge Stewart, the factual contentions that underlie
the Plaintiffs' state law claims against the Defendants have been
conclusively decided.
This said, Judge Stewart's legal conclusions bar Plaintiffs'
claims under the Utah Constitution because there is no historical
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or textual basis for interpreting Utah's Constitutional
provisions in this case differently from the Federal
Constitution.

Moreover, no Utah appellate decision supports

interpreting the Utah Constitution to provide broader or
different rights in this case.
In sum, the facts, the alleged harm, and the analysis of
Plaintiffs' state law claims are the same as those already
considered and dismissed by Judge Stewart and, there being no
additional or different rights provided by the Utah Constitution,
dismissal is appropriate in this forum as well.
Defendant Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendant Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Defendant Eiseman's Motion for Summary Judgment are^gr^nted.
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DAVID G. WILLIAMS (3481)
ANDREW M. MORSE (4498)
R. SCOTT YOUNG (10695)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Lars M. Wagner and
Karen H. Albritton
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARKER JENSEN, a minor, by and through
his parents and natural guardians, BARBARA
and DAREN JENSEN; BARBARA JENSEN,
individually; and DAREN JENSEN,
)
individually,
)
Plaintiffs,
v.

)
)

STATE OF UTAH; INTERMOUNTAIN
)
HEALTH CARE, INC.; KARI
)
CUNNINGHAM, in her individual capacity; )
RICHARD ANDERSON, in his individual and )
official capacities; LARS M. WAGNER, in his )
individual capacity; DAVID L. CORWIN, in )
his individual capacity; CHERYL M. COFFIN, )
in her individual capacity; KAREN H.
)
ALBRITTON, in her individual capacity;
)
SUSAN EISENMAN, in her individual
)
capacity; and JANE and JOHN DOE, in their )
individual capacities,
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Exhibit 3

Memorandum Decision (Judge Ted Stewart),
September 22, 2008

.JLVt\
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

P J., a minor, by and through his parents and
natural guardians, BARBARA and DAREN
JENSEN, etal.,
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND REMANDING
STATE LAW CLAIMS

Plaintiffs,

vs.

STATE OF UTAH, et al,

CaseNo.2:05-CV-739TS

Defendants.

This § 1983 case arises from a protracted dispute between Plaintiffs Daren and Barbara
Jensen and the State of Utah regarding the proper medical care for their son, Plaintiff P.J.
Currently before the Court are the summary judgment motions of Defendants Richard Anderson,
Kari Cunningham, Susan Eisenman, Dr. Lars Wagner, and Dr. Karen Albritton. After carefully
considering the parties' submissions and having heard oral argument, the Court will grant the
summary judgment motions with regard to the Jensens' § 1983 claims for the reasons discussed
below. As the Jensens' state law claims involve important issues of Utah law, the Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will remand the state claims to the Utah court from
which they were removed.

1

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 In considering whether
genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented.2 The Court is
required to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.3
II. FACTS
The following is a summary of the factual background in this case, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Jensens: On April 30, 2003, 12-year-old P.J. had a small growth removed
from the floor of his mouth by an oral surgeon named Dr. Christensen. The tissue removed by
Dr. Christensen was sent to Laboratory Corporation of America in Kent, Washington for
analysis. LabCorp informed Dr. Christensen that the sample was malignant. Dr. Christensen
then referred P.J. to Dr. Harlan Munz at Primary Children's Medical Center ("PCMC") in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
The Jensens met with Dr. Munz on May 9, 2003. After examining P.J., Dr. Munz
referred him to PCMC's oncology department where he met with Dr. Wagner. Dr. Wagner first
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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig, 924
F.2dl82, 183 (10th Cir. 1991).
3

See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991).
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met with and examined PJ. that same day, but could not offer any diagnosis until after PCMC's
pathology department completed its own testing.
Upon PCMC's request, LabCorp sent P.J.'s tissue sample to PCMC's pathology
department. On May 20, 2003, Dr. Lowichik completed the pathology report on P.J.'s tissue,
diagnosing the growth as "EWING SARCOMA/PERIPHERAL PRIMITIVE
NEUROECTODERMAL TUMOR"4 (i.e., Ewing's Sarcoma). This diagnosis was rendered
based on immunohistochemical staining and the appearance of the tumor cells. The pathology
report indicates that P.J.'s "case was reviewed by [fellow pathologist] [Dr. Coffin] who concurs
with this interpretation."5 The deposition testimony of the pathologists likewise indicates that
both of them reviewed the testing and were confident in the diagnosis. Dr. Lowichik estimated
her confidence in the diagnosis to be "in the high 90 percent."6 Dr. Coffin reviewed the testing
and was also very confident that the tumor was Ewing's Sarcoma. In fact, Dr. Coffin testified
that the diagnosis was rendered with near certainty.
In addition to immunohistochemical staining, Ewing's Sarcoma may be diagnosed
through cytogenetic and molecular genetic testing. Ewing's cells often manifest a chromosomal
translocation (an "11;22 translocation"), which may be detected through these tests. The
presence of an 11;22 translocation indicates that a specimen is Ewing's Sarcoma. Cytogenetic
testing may be performed only on fresh or frozen tissue. Where a tissue sample is placed in

'Docket No. 345, Ex. 32.
5

Id.
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Docket No. 334, Ex. 4, at 31.
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formalin or paraffin, cytogenetic testing is not possible. Although not optimal, molecular testing
can be performed on tissues samples that have been placed in formalin or paraffin.
In 2003, PCMC would commonly attempt to conduct cytogenetic testing on sarcoma
tissue samples that were excised at PCMC where "there was adequate sample left over after the
standard pathology examination."7 Molecular testing was available through an affiliated
institution. In 2003, it would not have been unusual for a PCMC pathologist to send samples out
for molecular testing to provide further diagnostic information.
Because the tissue removed from P.J.'s mouth by Dr. Christensen was placed in formalin
or paraffin, cytogenetic testing could not be performed on that specimen. There were still tumor
cells in P.J.'s mouth, which could have been extracted for this purpose. However, this would
have required further surgery to obtain a sample. In contrast, molecular testing could have been
performed on the tissue sample obtained by Dr. Christensen.
Dr. Wagner discussed the diagnosis of P.J.'s tissue sample with Dr. Coffin. She told him
that she was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. According to Dr.
Coffin, where the cell appearance and immunohistochemical staining fit "the criteria for the
diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma," it is not necessary to perform cytogenetic or molecular testing to
establish the diagnosis.8
On May 21, 2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens for more than an hour. Dr. Wagner
expressed his confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis and explained the need for
chemotherapy to begin right away. Dr. Wagner further explained the difference between
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Docket No. 345, Ex. 15, at 23.
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Docket No. 334, Ex. 3, at 43-44.
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localized and non-localized Ewing's Sarcoma. Specifically, Dr. Wagner informed the Jensens
that the cure rate for localized disease—where there is no evidence of cancer in places other than
where it was discovered—was approximately 70% when treated with the recommended
chemotherapy, but that the cure rate for non-localized (metastatic) disease was as low as 20%.
Thus, Dr. Wagner explained the necessity of beginning treatment right away to prevent the
cancer from spreading throughout PJ.'s body.
That same day, radiographic examinations were performed on PJ.'s neck, thorax, chest,
and skull to determine whether the cancer had spread beyond the floor of PJ.'s mouth. Each of
these tests returned negative. Ms. Jensen testified that at this point they asked Dr. Wagner "if
there was any other test he could run to help confirm that it was Ewing's and he said no."9 "He
was sure it was Ewing's."10
During the May 21, 2003 visit, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagner to have PJ.'s tissue sample
sent to the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a second opinion. Dr. Wagner
informed the Jensens that insurance companies often would not pay for a second opinion and
encouraged them to contact their insurance provider. Nonetheless, Dr. Wagner agreed to the
second opinion and sent the tissue sample to Dana-Farber as requested. The Jensens ultimately
cancelled the Dana-Farber consultation.
The Jensens met with Dr. Wagner again on May 29, 2003. At this meeting the Jensens
asked Dr. Wagner to order a Positron Emission Tomography ("PET") scan. Dr. Wagner refused
to order a PET scan, explaining that it would not be useful in PJ.'s situation because there was

'Docket No. 345, Ex. 12, at 127.
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Id. at 134.
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no other evidence of metastatic disease. Dr. Wagner further explained to the Jensens that a
negative PET scan would not change the need for chemotherapy. The Jensens again asked Dr.
Wagner if there were other tests to confirm the E wing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner said no.
By early June 2003, the Jensens and Dr. Wagner differed significantly in their views
regarding P.J.'s medical care. Accordingly, a meeting between the Jensens, Dr. Wagner, Dr.
Lemons (head of the oncology department), a PCMC social worker, and PCMC's head of quality
assurance was scheduled for June 9, 2003, at PCMC. Dr. Wagner again emphasized the need to
begin treating P.J. with chemotherapy right away in order to prevent the cancer from spreading.
The Jensens' statements during the meeting are disputed. The Jensens contend that they refused
to consent to the proposed chemotherapy based on their desire for further confirmatory tests. Dr.
Wagner contends that they refused chemotherapy because they wanted to pursue an alternative
treatment called Insulin Potentiation Therapy. Regardless, the parties were unable to resolve the
impasse. During the meeting, the PCMC head of quality assurance told the Jensens that a
referral to the Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS") might be necessary. The Jensens
left the meeting, telling the PCMC representatives, "You're fired."11
At some point, Dr. Corwin of Safe and Healthy Families—a division of PCMC with the
responsibility of ensuring that patients are not left untreated—became involved in P.J.'s case.
Around June 12, 2003, Dr. Corwin attempted to make contact with the Jensens. Dr. Corwin and
Mr. Jensen had a lengthy telephone conversation on June 15, 2003, but were unable to reach an
agreement as to P.J.'s medical care. Dr. Corwin and Mr. Jensen unsuccessfully attempted to
schedule a further meeting to discuss the situation. At that point, the decision was made to refer

"A/., Ex. 13, at 181.
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P.J.'s case to DCFS for medical neglect in refusing what the doctors believed was medically
necessary treatment.
On June 16, 2003, a regularly-scheduled meeting was held at PCMC with representatives
from DCFS, PCMC, and other community organizations in the child welfare system. Dr.
Wagner and Dr. Corwin were also present. At this meeting, and in a case summary submitted to
DCFS, Dr. Wagner summarized his interaction with the Jensens. A formal referral to DCFS was
made that same day. The parties dispute whether it was Dr. Corwin or Dr. Wagner who actually
submitted the referral. For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the Court must presume
the latter.
DCFS assigned P.J.'s case to Ms. Cunningham, a DCFS social worker. Dr. Wagner and
Dr. Corwin provided Ms. Cunningham with information regarding their understanding of P.J.'s
situation, both orally and by written case summaries. Ms. Cunningham was also present at the
June 16, 2003 meeting at PCMC. Based on communications with Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunningham
was under the impression that P.J.'s situation was a medical emergency and that something
needed to be done within a matter of hours or days.
On June 18, 2003, Ms. Cunningham, through Assistant Attorney General Lund, filed a
Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody and Guardianship (the "Verified Petition") in
the Third District Juvenile Court for Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Juvenile Court"). Ms.
Cunningham filed the Verified Petition based entirely on the information provided to her by Drs.
Wagner and Corwin. She did not do any independent investigation of P.J.'s referral.
On June 20, 2008, the Jensens first appeared before the Juvenile Court. Ms. Eisenman
represented DCFS in place of Ms. Lund and became the primary Assistant Attorney General on
P.J.'s case. At that hearing, the Jensens' attorney, Mr. Frank Mylar, represented that the Jensens
7

were interested in obtaining further tests of the tissue sample excised by Dr. Christensen. The
Court continued the hearing until July 10, 2003, as the parties indicated that a stipulation
regarding P.J.'s treatment was possible.
Around this time, the Jensens sought out Dr. Birkmayer, who practiced in Vienna,
Austria. After reviewing P.J.'s medical records, Dr. Birkmayer indicated to the Jensens that he
was not "totally convinced" that PJ. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that chemotherapy was not
necessary.12 The Jensens expressed their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer supervise P.J.'s treatment.
On July 2, 2003, Ms. Eisenman sent an email to Dr. Birkmayer in which she asked questions
regarding, among other things, Dr. Birkmayer's qualifications and licensure and whether Austria
had a standard of care similar to that used by the American Academy of Pediatrics. After
receiving Ms. Eisenman's email from Dr. Birkmayer, Mr. Mylar instructed Ms. Eisenman not to
contact Dr. Birkmayer directly, but to direct inquiries regarding Dr. Birkmayer to Mr. Mylar.
According to Mr. Jensen, the Jensens abandoned their desire to have Dr. Birkmayer treat P.J. at
that time because DCFS was requiring that P.J.'s medical care be provided by a board-certified
pediatric oncologist.
In late June 2003, Dr. Wagner left Utah to pursue a new job in Ohio. He informed Ms.
Eisenman that he was leaving and that she could contact Dr. Lemons or Dr. Albritton if she
needed anything. In preparation for the July 10, 2003 hearing, Ms. Eisenman disclosed to the
Juvenile Court that she intended to prove her case using three medical experts: Drs. Coffin,
Wagner, and Albritton. In preparation for the hearing, Ms. Eisenman provided Dr. Albritton
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Docket No. 345, Ex. 48. Notably, Plaintiffs represent that they submit Dr. Birkmayer's
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of the matter asserted.
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with materials related to the case, including Dr. Wagner's case summary and a list of questions
that might be asked. Mr. Mylar objected to the introduction of testimony at the July 10, 2003
hearing because the hearing was set for a pre-trial conference and not an evidentiary hearing.
The Juvenile Court affirmed the objection and Drs. Albritton and Coffin did not testify at that
time.
At the July 10, 2003 hearing, the Jensens again raised the issue of whether P.J. really had
Ewing's Sarcoma. The parties stipulated that the Jensens would have P.J. examined by doctors
at the Children's Hospital of Los Angeles ("CHLA") and that the Jensens would abide by their
treatment recommendations. The Juvenile Court set another pretrial conference for July 28,
2003. Per the stipulation, the Jensens traveled to Los Angeles, where P.J. met with Dr. Tishler
on July 21, 2003. At this meeting, Dr. Tishler informed the Jensens that he was recommending
chemotherapy based on the prior pathology tests, but that CHLA would do its own pathology
analysis and genetic testing to confirm the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis. The Jensens were
unhappy with this result as they believed that Dr. Tishler was not performing an independent
evaluation, but was merely deferring to the PCMC doctors.
Based on this dissatisfaction, the Jensens did not return again to CHLA, but instead
sought medical care from Dr. Charles Simone. Dr. Simone initially agreed to treat P.J.
However, upon learning of the legal battle in which the Jensens were entrenched, Dr. Simone
declined involvement. Nonetheless, the Jensens believed that Dr. Simone would still agree to
treat P.J. if the Juvenile Court would permit it.
At the hearing on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court received a report from Dr. Tishler via
telephone regarding P.J.'s evaluation at CHLA. Dr. Tishler indicated that to his knowledge the
CHLA testing was not yet complete. However, he also stated that there was no question that P.J.
9

had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy right away and that the remaining
pathological and radiological tests would serve only to clarify what type of tumor he had for
purposes of tailoring the chemotherapy to P.J.'s needs. The Jensens' new attorney, Mr. Blake
Nakamura, advocated the Jensens' concern that not all of the testing had been completed.
Nonetheless, based on Dr. Tishler's testimony, the Juvenile Court ordered that PJ. commence
chemotherapy before August 8, 2003, without regard to the CHLA test results. The Juvenile
Court also provided that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not needed, the
Jensens were free to bring that fact to the Juvenile Court's attention.
Mr. Nakamura also represented to the Juvenile Court at the July 28 hearing that the
Jensens were not comfortable with Dr. Tishler and would prefer that PJ. be treated by Dr.
Simone. During the hearing, the Juvenile Court asked Dr. Albritton whether Dr. Simone could
be the primary treating physician. Dr. Albritton answered:
No, we wouldn't make him the primary oncologist. My understanding, in fact, is
that he is not board certified in oncology, either pediatric or medical oncology.
He's - from what little I know, he's a specialist in complimentary and alternative
medicine. So the gist I get is that he would be asking someone either in Utah or
L.A. to be prescribing the chemotherapy and then he would be suggesting the
complimentary approaches that might diminish side effects and so on. I do not
think there will be an oncologist in Utah or L.A. who would let him prescribe the
chemotherapy from New Jersey.13
The Juvenile Court also asked Dr. Tishler whether P.J.'s primary treating physician
needed to be a board certified oncologist. Dr. Tishler answered: "Definitely. There's no other
physician that could lead the care and provide the care."14 Based on this, the Juvenile Court
ordered that P.J.'s primary treating physician be a board certified pediatric oncologist or
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hematologist, but that Dr. Simone was authorized to work with P.J.'s other treating physicians.
The Court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition for August 20, 2003, in
the event P J.'s situation was not yet resolved.
The Jensens never returned to CHLA or PCMC to receive the ordered chemotherapy for
P.J. Instead, they sought evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic in Houston, Texas. Around August
6, 2003, the Jensens contacted the Burzynski Clinic to inquiry whether it could treat P.J. On
August 7, 2003, an employee of the Burzynski Clinic called the Jensens to indicate that the
Clinic was willing to see him. Accordingly, an appointment was set for August 12, 2003.
At this point, the Jensens apparently believed that they did not have to comply with the
Juvenile Court's order to begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003, and that this would only result
in the Juvenile Court's holding the August 20, 2003 evidentiary hearing on the Verified Petition.
Thus, on August 8, 2003, the Jensens took P.J. and the rest of their children to Bear Lake in
Idaho to go boating. From Idaho, they planned to travel to Houston for P.J. to be evaluated at the
Burzynski Clinic on August 12.
Having not received confirmation that P.J.'s chemotherapy was underway, Ms. Eisenman
sought a hearing with the Juvenile Court on August 8, 2003, for the purpose of seeking
authorization to take PJ. into protective custody. Ms. Eisenman called Mr. Nakamura to notify
him of her intent to obtain a protective custody order. Present at the August 8, 2003 hearing
were Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, P.J.'s guardian ad litem, and Mr. Nakamura. Mr.
Nakamura participated in the August 8 hearing by telephone. Mr. Nakamura indicated that P.J.
was not receiving chemotherapy, that the Jensens did not want to initiate chemotherapy, and that
they were taking P.J. to the Burzynski Clinic for evaluation. In response to the disclosure of the
Jensens' intent to seek evaluation at the Burzynski Clinic, Ms. Cunningham paged Dr. Albritton,
11

who then participated in the hearing by telephone. The Juvenile Court and counsel asked Dr.
Albritton whether the Burzynski Clinic was qualified to provide P.J.'s treatment. Dr. Albritton
indicated that Dr. Burzynski was not a board certified oncologist-hematologist and that his clinic
is known for providing extremely controversial therapy. Dr. Albritton further indicated that she
was unaware of any pediatric oncologists at the Burzynski Clinic, but would need more time to
confirm that fact. Finally, Dr. Albritton testified that the Burzynski Clinic was not an
appropriate option for a newly-diagnosed cancer patient who had not exhausted standard
treatment options.
Ms. Eisenman then filed an Application to Take a Child Into Protective Custody. This
application was supported by an affidavit signed by Ms. Cunningham on August 8, 2003.
Attached to Ms. Cunningham's affidavit was an affidavit executed by Dr. Wagner on July 22,
2003. The Juvenile Court signed an order authorizing DCFS to take P.J. into protective custody,
finding that it was in P.J.'s best interest. Ms. Eisenman enlisted the help of Sandy City Police
Officer Peterson, whom she had contacted earlier that day, to help serve the warrant. Officer
Peterson was unable to serve the warrant because the Jensens had already left for Bear Lake
earlier that day.
Mr. Nakamura informed the Jensens that the Juvenile Court had signed a "pickup order"
and that P.J. was to be placed in DCFS custody to begin chemotherapy. Despite this, the Jensens
decided to stay in Idaho and seek an independent opinion of P.J.'s condition in preparation for
the evidentiary hearing scheduled for August 20, 2003.
On August 13,2003, P.J.'s guardian ad litem filed a motion for an order to show cause.
After hearing the motion that same day, the Juvenile Court entered a bench warrant for the
Jensens' arrest and ordered them to appear and present P.J. However, a Juvenile Court clerk told
12

Ms. Eisenman and PJ.'s guardian ad litem that a Juvenile Court warrant would not be placed on
a national database, which would require an adult warrant. Perhaps recognizing this, Ms.
Eisenman announced to the Jensens' attorneys and PJ.'s guardian ad litem that if the Jensens did
not cooperate with the Juvenile Court orders, she would have to go to local and federal law
enforcement authorities.
Based on information provided by Ms. Eisenman to Officer Peterson, the Salt Lake
County District Attorney's Office agreed to screen the Jensen matter for criminal charges on
August 15, 2003. Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, and PJ.'s guardian ad litem attended the
August 15 screening. That same day, the District Attorney's Office filed criminal charges
against the Jensens, including one count of custodial interference and one count of kidnaping.
On August 16,2003, Mr. Jensen was arrested in Idaho where he spent four days in jail
before he was released on bail. Upon Mr. Jensen's arrest, Ms. Jensen left Idaho and took P J. to
Houston in an attempt to meet with the Burzynski Clinic. However, the Burzynski Clinic refused
to see P.J. because Ms. Eisenman and PJ.'s guardian ad litem informed the clinic that the State
had been granted protective custody over P.J. and did not consent to his treatment.
The Juvenile Court held a non-evidentiary hearing on August 20, 2003. In that hearing,
Mr. Nakamura read a letter written by Mr. Jensen and explained that the Jensens wished to have
an opportunity to present evidence. The Juvenile Court agreed to set an evidentiary hearing, but
refused to lift the warrants.
Shortly after this hearing, Ms. Eisenman assumed a new position in the Attorney
General's Office and no longer participated in PJ.'s case. Additionally, Mr. Anderson, Director
of DCFS, was asked by a representative of Utah's Governor to personally assist in negotiating a
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resolution to P.J.'s case. Accordingly, on August 27, 2003, Mr. Anderson flew to Idaho to meet
with the Jensens where negotiations continued for several days.
On September 5, 2003, the parties entered into a stipulation in which the Jensens agreed
to submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Johnston—a board-certified pediatric oncologist—of St. Luke's
Hospital in Boise, Idaho, and to abide by his treatment recommendations. DCFS agreed to ask
the Juvenile Court to return full custody of P.J. to the Jensens and to vacate the warrants. After
receiving assurances that the Jensens would submit to chemotherapy if Dr. Johnston
recommended it, the Juvenile Court approved the stipulation.
After performing his evaluation, Dr. Johnston concluded that P.J. needed chemotherapy.
The Jensens again refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy, claiming that Dr. Johnston was
merely rubber-stamping the diagnosis of the PCMC doctors. Mr. Jensen told Dr. Johnston that if
P.J. ever did receive chemotherapy at St. Luke's, he would "make sure it's a hellish experience
for everybody involved."15
Another hearing was held in the Juvenile Court on October 8,2003. At the October 8
hearing, Dr. Johnston testified that he had confirmed P.J. had Ewing's Sarcoma and that the
Jensens had rejected his recommendation that P.J. undergo chemotherapy. Assistant Attorney
General Mark May, who replaced Ms. Eisenman on P.J.'s case, indicated that the parties would
attempt to reach a settlement.
Having determined that the Jensens would not submit P.J. to chemotherapy under any
circumstances, DCFS filed a Motion to Dismiss Verified Petition on October 22, 2003. In its
Motion, DCFS stated that its decision to dismiss the Verified Petition was made with full

15

Docket No. 344, Ex. 11, at 700-01.
14

recognition that without chemotherapy P.J.'s chances of survival would fall dramatically.
Nonetheless, DCFS concluded that it was simply unworkable to attempt to force a 13-year-old
boy to undergo chemotherapy unwillingly.
On October 2, 2003, the Jensens entered a plea agreement with the State on the criminal
charges. The Jensens agreed to enter a guilty plea and abeyance on the custodial interference
charge in exchange for the State's promise to dismiss the kidnaping charge.
III. DISCUSSION
In July 2005, the Jensens filed a Complaint in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake County, Utah, against the State of Utah, Intermountain Health Care, Inc., Ms. Cunningham,
Mr. Anderson, Dr. Wagner, Dr. Corwin, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Albritton, and Ms. Eisenman. In their
Complaint, the Jensens allege the following causes of action: (1) § 1983 - violation of the
substantive due process right to direct medical care (2) § 1983 - violation of the substantive due
process right to familial association;16 (3) § 1983 - malicious prosecution under the Fourth

16

In their Complaint, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their right to familial
association under both the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, in the Tenth Circuit "the familial right of association is properly based
on the 'concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Griffen v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544,
1547 (10th Cir. 1993). The Court recognizes that the Tenth Circuit has, in dictum, recognized a
First Amendment right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate or private relationships."
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 358 (10th Cir. 2006)
(dealing with expressive association). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit has consistently analyzed
familial association claims within the substantive due process framework, even in cases decided
subsequent to the Grace United Methodist Church case. See Estate of Herring v. City of
Colorado Springs, 233 Fed. Appx. 854, 856 (10th Cir. May 18, 2007) (recognizing that "the
familial right of association is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty")
(unpublished decision); Suasnavas v. Stover, 196 Fed. Appx. 647, 654 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006)
("The right of familial association is a substantive due process right....") (unpublished
decision); Chatwin v. Barlow, 2008 WL 501109, at *4 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 2008) ("The Tenth
Circuit has recognized that the freedom of familial association is a substantive right guaranteed
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (unpublished decision). Based on the
long line of cases employing the standards set forth in Griffen, the Court finds that the Jensens'
15

Amendment; (4) § 1983 - violation of the Ninth Amendment; (5) violation of article I, section 1
of the Utah Constitution; (6) violation of article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution; (7)
violation of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; (8) violation of article I, section 25 of
the Utah Constitution; (9) wrongful initiation; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
After removing the case to this Court, the Defendants filed motions to dismiss. In an
Order dated June 16, 2006, the Court dismissed the State of Utah on the basis of sovereign
immunity and Drs. Corwin and Coffin on the basis of absolute immunity. The Court also
dismissed the fourth and eighth causes of action in their entirety and the first and third causes of
action to the extent they were asserted by P.J. IHC has since been voluntarily dismissed.
After the close of discovery on the issue of liability, Mr. Anderson, Ms. Cunningham,
Ms. Eisenman, Dr. Wagner, and Dr. Albritton filed the motions presently before the Court,
arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' federal claims based on the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, absolute immunity, and qualified immunity.
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
"Rooker-Feldman precludes federal district courts from effectively exercising appellate
jurisdiction over claims "actually decided by a state court' and claims 'inextricably intertwined'
with a prior state-court judgment."17 The doctrine arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), which allows

familial association claims arise from and are appropriately analyzed under Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
11

Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kenmen
Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16

review of state-court judgments by the United States Supreme Court and, by negative inference,
precludes lower federal courts from exercising such jurisdiction.18
Noting that the doctrine had, at times, been applied by lower courts far beyond its original
contours, the Supreme Court declared in the case of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries
Corp.,19 that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to "cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments."20 The Tenth Circuit summarized the Exxon Mobil holding as follows:
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Exxon Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply "simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a
matter previously litigated in state court." To the contrary, a party may lose in
state court and then raise precisely the same legal issues in federal court, so long
as the relief sought in the federal action would not reverse or undo the relief
granted by the state court: "if a federal plaintiff 'presents] some independent
claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a
case to which he was a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction . . . .'"21
Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman applies only where the relief sought in the federal case would
"reverse or undo the state court judgment."22
Rooker-Feldman has been applied to constitutional claims arising from child custody
proceedings in state courts. For example, in Warnick v. Briggs,23 this Court applied the doctrine
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544 U.S. 280 (2005).
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Id.
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2007 WL 3231609 (D. Utah Oct. 30, 2007).
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to a § 1983 claim alleging various constitutional violations against several state actors, seeking
review of the circumstances surrounding the removal of the plaintiffs child by the state without
a pre-removal hearing.24 The Court found that "if it adjudicated Plaintiffs' claims relating to [the
child's] removal, [it] would effectively act as an appellate court in reviewing the juvenile court's
disposition."25 Applying Rooker-Feldman in that situation made sense as the juvenile court
heard and decided the issue of whether the circumstances justified the child's removal, and the
plaintiff did not challenge the "integrity of the evidence" before the juvenile court.26
However, where a plaintiffs federal cause of action is for injury sustained as a result of
actions taken during the course of the custody proceedings that are separate from the judgments
of the state court, Rooker-Feldman does not apply. The case of Brokaw v. Weaver*1 of the
Seventh Circuit is particularly persuasive on this point and is closely analogous to the Jensens'
case. In Brokaw, the plaintiff was removed from her parents and placed in state custody by order
of a state court after a social worker and others fabricated a charge of child neglect.28
Subsequently, another state court found no continuing basis to hold the plaintiff in state custody
and released her to her parents.29 Years later, after reaching the age of majority, the plaintiff
brought suit in federal court against the social worker and the others who made up the neglect

24

M at*9-10.
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Id. at* 10.
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Id
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305F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002).
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charges, alleging violations of her right to familial relations under substantive due process,
violation of the Fourth Amendment in her removal, and violation of procedural due process.30
The district court dismissed the case based on application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the actions of the defendants "violated her
constitutional rights, independently of the state court decision."31 The court recognized that the
plaintiffs injuries would not have happened without the state court's order directing her removal
and placing her in state custody. Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiffs claims were
independent of the state court judgments, emphasizing that even if the plaintiff "would not have
suffered any damages absent the state order . . . her claim for damages [was] based on an alleged
independent violation of her constitutional rights. It was this separate constitutional violation
which caused the adverse state court decision."32 Thus, the true cause of the plaintiffs injuries
was the defendant's actions, even though the injuries would not have occurred absent the state
court's order.33
In this case, the Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to the
Jensens' claims, as they seek relief independent from any judgements rendered by the state
courts. The Jensens do not seek to reverse or undo any judgments of the state courts. After all,
the Verified Petition was ultimately dismissed and full custody of P.J. returned to the Jensens.

3l

Id. at 665.
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Id. at 667; see also Holloway v. Borsh, 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding §
1983 suit against caseworker independent of state custody proceedings based on actions taken by
the caseworker during the course of the state proceedings).
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Rather, the Jensens' claims are based on the separate conduct of the Defendants previous to and
during the course of the proceedings in the state courts. Although the Juvenile Court was surely
called upon to balance the parental rights of the Jensens with the State's interest in protecting
PJ.'s welfare, nothing in the record indicates that either the Juvenile Court or the state criminal
court heard and ruled on claims that the Defendants deliberately misrepresented and omitted
material facts to the state courts, to each other, to the District Attorney's Office, or others
involved in the events surrounding PJ.'s medical care in 2003.
Thus, the Jensens allege independent claims similar to those in the Brokaw case.
Although much of the injury alleged by the Jensens would not have resulted in the absence of the
Juvenile Court's orders, the Jensens argue that the underlying cause of those orders was the
Defendants' factual misrepresentations and omissions. The Jensens' claims are different from
those in the Warnick case, where the state court entered specific findings of fact on the very
events complained of by the plaintiffs and where there was no challenge to the integrity of the
evidence. It is true that granting relief to the Jensens in this case might require the Court to enter
findings that contradict issues decided by the state court. However, this does not, of itself,
invoke the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.34 Thus, the constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is
separate and independent from any orders of the state courts, precluding application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
It must be noted, however, that the Jensens' claims are properly before this Court only to
the extent that they allege the Defendants engaged in conduct that was not brought before the
Juvenile Court or conduct that materially affected the integrity of the evidence on which the

34

Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237.
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Juvenile Court relied. It is not for this Court to decide whether P.J. actually had Ewing's
Sarcoma or whether the Juvenile Court properly balanced the State's interest in protecting
children and the Jensens' constitutional rights. Those issues, and other similar matters, were
squarely ruled on by the Juvenile Court and could only be properly challenged by the Jensens
through an appeal.
B. Absolute Immunity
"The Supreme Court has recognized the defense of absolute immunity from civil rights
suits in several well-established contexts involving the judicial process."35 "[S]tate attorneys and
agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and
pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from suit
under section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated with the judicial... process."36
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that social workers are entitled to absolute immunity when they
meet this criteria.37
The Court applies a "functional approach" to determine whether activities are sufficiently
connected with the judicial process to merit absolute immunity.38 A prosecutor is entitled to
absolute prosecutorial immunity "when performing the traditional functions of an advocate."39
Thus, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity even when he or she is accused of making
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Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Snell, 920 F.2d at 687-91 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976)).
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Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997).
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misrepresentations to the court, as long as the actions were taken in the role of an advocate.40
"However, absolute immunity does not extend to actions 'that are primarily investigative or
administrative in nature,' though it 'may attach even to such administrative or investigative
activities when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an
officer of the court.'"41
As a general rule, witnesses who testify in a judicial proceeding, whether during trial or
before, are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from suit arising from their testimony.42
However, absolute witness immunity is not available to "complaining witnesses"—"the person
(or persons) who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff—for
testimony "that is relevant to the manner in which the complaining witness initiated or
perpetuated the prosecution."43
As explained below, the Court finds that Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are absolutely
immune from all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims. Ms. Cunningham is likewise entitled to absolute
immunity with regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition, but is not so entitled with
regard to the rest of the conduct alleged in the Jensens' Complaint.
Ms. Eisenman. Ms. Eisenman argues that she is absolutely immune from the Jensens'
claims arising from functions performed in her role as an advocate or in fulfillment of her duties
as an officer of the Juvenile Court. The Jensens claim that Ms. Eisenman engaged in a number

"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n.34.
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Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 (quoting Pfeiffer, 929 F.2d at 1490) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
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'Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1400 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Id. at 1399 n.2, 1402.
22

of harmful activities outside the scope of her advocate role, which are grouped as follows for
purposes of analysis: (1) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the Juvenile Court;
(2) misrepresentations to Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, and Utah Attorney General
Shurtleff;44 (3) factual misrepresentations and omissions made to the District Attorney's Office;
and (4) other investigative activities. Additionally, although not discussed by the Jensens, Ms.
Eisenman contends that she is immune from claims arising from the August 2003 letter to the
Burzynski Clinic in which Ms. Eisenman informed the Clinic of the custody order and forbade
the clinic from providing any treatment to PJ. The Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to
absolute immunity with respect to all of the Jensens § 1983 claims.
Ms. Eisenman is absolutely immune with regard to the first group—misrepresentations
made to the Juvenile Court. Even assuming that Ms. Eisenman intentionally misrepresented
facts to the Juvenile Court, those misrepresentations were made in her role as an advocate. There
is no evidence that any of the alleged misrepresentations were made under oath or as a witness.
The Court likewise finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard
to the second group—misrepresentations to others involved in the Juvenile Court proceedings.
Ms. Eisenman's communications with these persons were all directly related to the Juvenile
Court proceedings. Ms. Cunningham and Mr. Anderson from DCFS were Ms. Eisenman's
clients. Attorney General Shurtleff was Ms. Eisenman's co-prosecutor, whose name was on the
Juvenile Court pleadings. The parties have not cited, nor has additional research uncovered, any
cases dealing with the question of whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for
communications with her clients and co-counsel. Nonetheless, these communications are
44

The Jensens also claim that a misrepresentation was made to the Guardian ad Litem, but
offer no citation to evidence that would support this assertion.
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directly related to a prosecutor's ability to present the State's case, satisfying the guiding
principle of prosecutorial immunity—proximity to the "judicial process and the initiation and
presentation of the state's case."45 A prosecutor must be able to freely speak with her client—the
very person for whom he is advocating—and the other prosecutors assigned to the case without
fear that their communications may later form the basis of a civil suit. These communications
likely include discussions of, among other things, trial preparation and strategy, discussion of
applicable law, as well as plea and settlement opportunities. Allowing claims to proceed against
a prosecutor based on information shared (or not shared) during the course of discussions with
his client and/or his fellow prosecutor would interfere with the prosecutor's ability to present the
State's case.46 Thus, the public policy behind the prosecutorial privilege—"to allow
functionaries in the judicial system the latitude to perform their tasks absent the threat of
retaliatory litigation"47—fully supports Ms. Eisenman's entitlement to absolute immunity with
regard to her communications with Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Anderson, and Attorney General
Shurtleff.
The Court also finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with regard to
the third category—misrepresentations made to the District Attorney. The Jensens have
submitted sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Eisenman provided the District Attorney's Office
with factual information that led to the criminal charges against the Jensens. In the absence of
other considerations, this would render Ms. Eisenman a complaining witness, absolving her of
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prosecutorial immunity with regard to the criminal case.4 However, the Juvenile Court had
ordered that DCFS take protective custody of P.J. Despite being apprised by their attorney of the
Juvenile Court's custody order, the Jensens refused to return to Utah and produce P.J. Seeking to
effectuate the Juvenile Court's order, Ms. Eisenman provided information to the District
Attorney's office which led to the initiation of criminal charges. It is clear to this Court that
these actions were intimately connected with her duties to the Juvenile Court.49 For these same
reasons, Ms. Eisenman's actions in drafting and sending the August 2003 letter to the Burzynski
Clinic were also intimately connected with the Juvenile Court proceedings. Accordingly, the
Court finds that Ms. Eisenman is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the Jensens'
claims related to her providing allegedly misleading information to the District Attorney's Office
and to her drafting and sending the August 2003 letter to the Burzynski Clinic.
With regard to the fourth grouping—investigative activities—the Jensens point to two
examples of investigative activities engaged in by Ms. Eisenman: (1) providing documents to Dr.
Albritton in advance of a July 10, 2003 hearing; and (2) sending an email to Dr. Birkmayer in
which she made false representations regarding the standard of care for Ewing's Sarcoma
treatment. Concerning the former, the Jensens do not show how providing documents to a
witness in the course of preparing for a hearing is investigative. With respect to the latter, the
Jensens offer the following evidence in support of their assertion that Ms. Eisenman discovered
the standard mentioned in the email to Dr. Birkmayer through her own investigative efforts: (1)

**Kalina, 522U.S. at 129-31.
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Cf Burrows v. Cherokee County Sheriffs Office, 38 Fed. Appx. 504, 506 (10th Cir.
Mar. 19, 2002) (granting immunity to prosecutor for his actions in seeking extradition order)
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Ms. Eisenman testified that she could not remember where she got the document containing the
referenced standard; (2) that Dr. Wagner testified that he did not give it to her; and (3) that P.J.'s
guardian ad litem did not recognize the document. Even when viewed in the light most favorable
to the Jensens, this testimony does not permit an inference that Ms. Eisenman obtained the
document through her own investigative efforts. A number of doctors participated in DCFS's
involvement with P.J.'s situation—including Drs. Lemons and Albritton, both pediatric
oncologists—any one of whom might have provided this information to Ms. Eisenman.
Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Eisenman is absolutely immune from these claims,
which are directly related to Ms. Eisenman's efforts to marshal the evidence and prepare for
witness examination.
Dr. Albritton. The Jensens' claims against Dr. Albritton are based on the following
allegations: (1) that Dr. Albritton stated to Ms. Eisenman, Ms. McDonald, and the Juvenile Court
that only a board-certified pediatric oncologist was qualified to treat P.J.; (2) that Dr. Albritton
misrepresented the qualifications and services of the Burzynski Clinic to the Juvenile Court; and
(3) that Dr. Albritton failed to disclose to the Juvenile Court and others that genetic testing was
routinely conducted at PCMC on cases of suspected Ewing's Sarcoma.50 Each of these
allegations are directly tied to Dr. Albritton's role as an expert witness in which she opined as to
the medical care required by P.J. and what doctors and facilities were capable of providing it.
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In opposing absolute immunity, the Jensens also point to circumstantial evidence that
they claims shows Dr. Albritton provided false information to Dr. Johnston. The Jensens argue
that this makes Dr. Albritton a complaining witness. However, nowhere in their briefs do the
Jensens rely on this evidence to support their constitutional claims. The Jensens make no effort
to show how Dr. Albritton's alleged conversation with Dr. Johnston violated their constitutional
rights.
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This was precisely what Dr. Albritton was subpoenaed to testify about. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Dr. Albritton is entitled to absolute immunity from the Jensens' § 1983 claims.
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens base their § 1983 claims against Ms. Cunningham on her
failure to investigate P.J.'s referral before filing the Verified Petition and on the factual
misrepresentations she allegedly made to the Juvenile Court. Ms. Cunningham contends that she
is absolutely immune from each of the claims asserted by the Jensens because she performed
only prosecutorial functions.
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham is entitled to absolute immunity, but only with
regard to her decision to file the Verified Petition. The Verified Petition was filed with an
accompanying "Verification" in which Ms. Cunningham swore under oath that the "matters
stated [in the Petition] are true."51 Although Ms. Cunningham surely exercised prosecutorial
discretion in electing to file the petition, she acted outside the scope of any prosecutorial function
by attesting under oath to the allegations in the Verified Petition as a complaining witness.52
Thus, although Ms. Cunningham is entitled to absolute immunity for her decision to file the
Verified Petition, she is not immune from the Jensens' claims based their contention that the
Verified Petition contained misrepresentations and omissions. For the same reasons, Ms.
Cunningham is not immune from the Jensen's claims arising from the submission of her August
2003 affidavits, which the Jensens claim contained factual misrepresentations and omissions.
Finally, Ms. Cunningham is not absolutely immune from the Jensens' claims arising from
her alleged failure to properly investigate P.J.'s referral because this duty did not sufficiently
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Verified Petition, Docket No. 345, Ex. 43, at 6.
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Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31.
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relate to the judicial proceedings. Certainly, prosecutorial immunity may be had for actions in
"obtaining, reviewing and evaluating evidence" prior to initiation of a criminal action.53
However, this is because these investigative actions "are necessary so that a prosecutor may
fulfill his function as an officer of the court."54 Although a judicial proceeding might result from
its fulfillment, Ms. Cunningham's duty to investigate reports of child neglect is for the purpose
of protecting the children who are the subject of those reports.55 Therefore, it cannot be said that
fulfillment of this duty is intimately associated with the judicial process. Accordingly, the Court
will deny Ms. Cunningham's request for summary judgment based on absolute immunity.
C. Qualified Immunity
Each of the Defendants also asserts qualified immunity with respect to the Jensens' §
1983 claims. Where a state actor raises a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary
judgment, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a strict two-part test: first, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right; second, the plaintiff
must show that this right was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue."56 "If, and
only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of
the movant for summary judgment—showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."57
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A right is clearly established where "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation."58 This determination must be made "in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition."59 That a right was clearly
established can be shown by controlling case law in the Tenth Circuit or by the weight of
authority in other circuits.60 Notably, though, the Supreme Court has held that "officials can still
be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances."61
In their § 1983 claims, the Jensens allege that Defendants violated their substantive due
process rights and their rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
1. Substantive Due Process
In their first and second causes of action, the Jensens62 claim that each of the Defendants
engaged in substantive due process violations of the Jensens' rights to familial association and to
direct P.J.'s medical care.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."63 In addition to procedural protections, the Due
Process Clause also provides two forms of "substantive" protection: (1) protection against
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refuse unwanted treatment. Thus, P.J. proceeds only on his familial association claim.
63

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1.
29

III-!-

government action that "shocks the conscience" and (2) protection of fundamental liberty
interests.64 In the case of Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, the Tenth Circuit recently clarified that
these two "strands of the substantive due process doctrine" are not mutually exclusive.65 Rather,
"by satisfying either the 'fundamental right' or the 'shocks the conscience' standards, a plaintiff
states a valid substantive due process claim."66 The Seegmiller court admonished: "Courts
should not unilaterally choose to consider only one or the other of the two strands. Both
approaches may well be applied in any given case."67
A substantive due process claim based on arbitrary and oppressive government action is
established where the conduct in question is so egregious that it "shocks the conscience of
federal judges."68 Mere negligence is clearly insufficient to meet this standard.69 For that matter,
even an intentional or reckless abuse of power that causes the plaintiff injury does not, of itself,
meet the "shocks the conscience" standard.70 Rather, there must be "a degree of outrageousness
and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking."71

"Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2008).
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A substantive due process plaintiff asserting a fundamental liberty interest must narrowly
articulate its scope.72 The Court must then determine whether the asserted interest is
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."73 Should
both of these hurdles be cleared, the plaintiff must then show that the government actor's conduct
infringed on the plaintiffs fundamental liberty interest and was "not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."74
The Jensens claim that Defendants infringed on their right to direct P.J.'s medical care
and their right to familial association. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process
Clause "protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of their children."75 This "fundamental right" encompasses both of the liberty
interests asserted by the Jensens, calling for application of the compelling interest/narrowly
tailored standard. In Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,16 the Tenth Circuit reversed a district court for
applying the "shocks the conscience" standard to the substantive due process claims of two
parents against the state for infringing on their right to direct the medical care of their children.77
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Although it ultimately declined to delineate the applicable standard due to the scant record before
it, the court included a parent's right to direct the medical care of his or her children among those
fundamental rights for which a substantive due process claim may be stated without meeting the
"shocks the conscience" standard.78
Dr. Wagner contends that the Jensens have not narrowly articulated their right to direct
P.J.'s medical care and, therefore, are not entitled to application of the compelling
interest/narrowly tailored standard. More specifically, Dr. Wagner argues that the Jensens' claim
to absolute autonomy in directing the medical care decisions of their son conflicts with the
"'Constitution's notions of ordered liberty,' which have always protected a child's right to
treatment whenever it has been unreasonably denied by a parent."79 The Court agrees with this
general proposition. However, with a few notable exceptions that are discussed below, the Court
does not read the Jensens' claimed right so broadly. The Jensens do not claim a right to direct
P.J.'s medical care free of any State interference. Rather, they claim that the State cannot
interfere with their right to direct P.J.'s medical care by making deliberate and material factual
misrepresentations and omissions to state courts and other decision makers during the process by
which that interference is accomplished. As the Court recognized in its June 2006 Order, when
the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care is placed in this context, it is not only fundamental,
but is also clearly established.80

"Docket No. 381, at 2.
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Docket No. 52, at 22, 34,41 (citing Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297-99 (10th
Cir. 2004); Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1202-03).
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The proper standard for claims of familial association is more complicated. As a
fundamental liberty interest,81 the right to familial association between a parent and his or her
child would logically be governed by the same standard applicable to other fundamental rights.
However, the Tenth Circuit has consistently applied a balancing test to claims for infringement
of the familial association right.82 In Griffen v. Strong, the Tenth Circuit called for a balancing
test to determine whether a state actor's conduct "constituted an undue burden" on a plaintiffs
right to familial association.83 A court applying the undue burden test should balance the
plaintiffs right to familial association against the relevant interests of the state, considering the
"severity of the alleged infringement, the need for the defendant's conduct, and any possible
alternatives."84 This standard clearly involves lower scrutiny than the compelling
interest/narrowly tailored test applicable to other fundamental rights. Indeed, the Griffen test
requires the plaintiff to show that the state actor directed his conduct at the familial relationship
"with knowledge that the . . . conduct will adversely affect that relationship."85
In its June 2006 Order, the Court opted to apply the Griffen standard as it remains good
law in the Tenth Circuit, but noted the conflict between the compelling interest/narrowly tailored
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and undue burden standards. As the Seegmiller decision had no occasion to specifically consider
the right to familial association in the child-welfare context or the long line of Tenth Circuit
cases applying the undue burden test, the Court will continue to apply the Griffen standard to the
Jensens' familial association claims.
Clearly, "the right to associate with one's family is a very substantial right."86 However,
this right "has never been deemed absolute or unqualified."87 It is clear that the state may
interfere with the right to familial association, even without prior notice and an opportunity to be
heard, where such action is needed to ensure the safety of a child.88 Thus, the Court must weigh
the State's interest in protecting children against the Jensens' interest in familial association,
given the factual record presented, to determine whether the State's interference constituted an
undue burden on the Jensens' right to familial association.
With this framework in mind, the Jensens' substantive due process claims against Dr.
Wagner, Ms. Cunningham, and Mr. Anderson are considered below.89
Dr. Wagner. The Jensens claim that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process
rights based on the following allegations: (1) Dr. Wagner refused to perform genetic and
molecular testing despite the Jensens' requests; (2) Dr. Wagner made this decision because of his
desire to enroll P.J. in a clinical trial, which he did not disclose to the Jensens; (3) Dr. Wagner
discouraged the Jensens from seeking a second opinion and then attempted to influence that
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on all of the Jensens' § 1983 claims.
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opinion; (4) Dr. Wagner did not inform Dr. Lemons, Dr. Albritton, Dr. Coffin, Dr. Lowichik, Dr.
Corwin, Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, or the Juvenile Court of his refusal to order genetic
and/or molecular testing; and (5) Dr. Wagner told Ms. Cunningham that P.J. could be dead in
five days in order to persuade her to skip the normal investigative process.
Having closely examined the record, the Court finds the Jensens have not established that
Dr. Wagner violated their substantive due process rights. It is undisputed that Drs. Lowichik and
Coffin diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's Sarcoma after performing immunohistochemical testing.
According to Dr. Coffin, this diagnosis was rendered with near certainty. Dr. Lowichik
estimated her level of certainty "in the high 90 percent."90 Dr. Coffin told Dr. Wagner that she
was confident in the diagnosis and that no further testing was needed. This, according to Dr.
Wagner, coupled with the need for immediate treatment, was the reason he did not order
additional testing. When the Jensens would not agree to begin treatment that he believed was
necessary to save P.J.'s life, Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS. The Jensens offer no
competent evidence to place these facts in dispute. Rather, the Jensens ask the Court to draw a
number of unreasonable inferences, which the record plainly will not support, in order to
attribute a more dubious purpose to Dr. Wagner's actions.
First, the Jensens point to the fact that Dr. Wagner was an administrator of a clinical trial
for which P.J. might have been eligible, arguing that this was the reason behind Dr. Wagner's
refusal to order more testing and his insisting on immediate chemotherapy treatment. Even
assuming that it was inappropriate to refuse further testing and that Dr. Wagner did refuse the
testing with the study in mind, the Jensens were free, at that point, to take P.J. to another facility
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and another doctor for further testing. Thus, Dr. Wagner's refusal to order further testing did not,
of itself, violate the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care free from unreasonable state
interference.
Moreover, outside of P.J.'s possible eligibility to participate in the trial, the Jensens have
produced no evidence that Dr. Wagner's decisions were motivated based on a desire to enroll P.J.
in the trial. Indeed, the record would not permit such an inference. It is undisputed that the trial
required enrollment within 30 days of the diagnostic biopsy—which, in P.J.'s case, occurred on
May 2, 2003. Thus, on June 2, 2003, P.J. was no longer eligible to participate in the trial. If Dr.
Wagner's refusal to order the tests and his push to immediately begin chemotherapy were
motivated by a desire to enroll P.J. in the clinical trail, surely his efforts would have ceased or
changed course after June 2, 2003. However, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner's efforts to ensure
that P.J. received chemotherapy continued after this date. It was not until after June 2, 2003, that
Dr. Wagner involved Dr. Corwin. At the June 9, 2003 meeting at PCMC, Dr. Wagner again
emphasized the need for P.J.'s chemotherapy to begin immediately before the cancer spread
throughout his body. Finally, it was not until June 16, 2003, that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case
to DCFS. In light of these undisputed facts, it is entirely unreasonable to infer that Dr. Wagner's
motivation for not ordering further testing and seeking immediate treatment was to enroll P.J. in
the clinical trial.
The Jensens next contend that Dr. Wagner discouraged them from seeking a second
opinion and then attempted to interfere with that opinion. In support of this claim, the Jensens
testified that Dr. Wagner told them that insurance companies would often not pay for a second
opinion, which would require the Jensens to pay for it. The Jensens also cite an email sent by Dr.
Wagner to the oncologist who was to perform the second opinion, in which he stated,
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Dear Dr. Grier,
I am a pediatric oncologist sat [sic] the University of Utah, and I was wondering if
you could provide consultation for a patient being followed in our clinic. This 12year-old boy underwent excision of a dome-shaped lesion at the floor of the
mouth. After careful review by Cheryl Coffin and other pathologists here in Salt
Lake, the diagnosis of Ewing's sarcoma has been made. Supporting this
diagnosis are the presence of small round blue cells which stain for 013, FLI-1,
andvimentin. There is a weak positivity of S-100. Desmin and actin are
negative, as are epithelial markers, CD3, and CD45. There was no fresh or frozen
tissue to send for RT-PCR for Ewing's translocations, although this possibly
could be done on archival paraffin-embedded tissue. If there is significant
diagnostic uncertainty, additional fresh tissue could likely be obtained by reexcision, as the margins were clearly positive.
I have discussed these results with the family, and expressed my confidence in the
thorough histologic work-up that has been done by expert personnel. However,
the family is interested in pursuing a second opinion, and has requested that we
sed [sic] the tslides [sic] and tissue block to you for further review. I have
explained that you are an oncologist and not a pathologist, etc., and that further
consultations will delay the start of therapy (the child is now 19 days postresection, as the tissue was initially sent to a pathologist in Washington who made
a diagnosis of "poorly differentiated malignancy" after performing a limited
immunihistovemocal [sic] work-up). Nevertheless, at their request, I am sending
by FedEX the tissue to your institution addressed to you. I would greatly
appreciate your help in expediting pathologic review so we can commence with
treatment for this young man.91
This evidence does not rise to the level of a unconstitutional infringement of the Jensens'
right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Whatever his motivations, the Jensens have offered no
evidence that Dr. Wagner's statement regarding the likelihood of insurance coverage was false.
Although Dr. Wagner clearly expressed confidence in the Ewing's Sarcoma diagnosis, along
with his desire to quickly begin treatment, the above email does not support a reasonable
inference that Dr. Wagner attempted to interfere with the second opinion sought by the Jensens.
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Finally, and most important to their substantive due process claims, the Jensens claim
that Dr. Wagner did not tell others involved in P.J.'s case—including Ms. Cunningham, Ms.
Eisenman, and the Juvenile Court—of his refusal to order further diagnostic tests despite the
Jensens' requests and that he falsely told Ms. Cunningham that P.J. would be dead within five
days. With respect to the former, even assuming that Dr. Wagner did in fact fail to tell others
about his refusal to order the genetic and/or molecular tests, there is no evidence that he did so
deliberately. Rather, as outlined above, the record demonstrates that Dr. Wagner believed that
those tests were unnecessary and would delay needed treatment based on the diagnosis of Drs.
Coffin and Lowichik. To the extent the Jensens claim substantive due process rights that would
impose liability on Dr. Wagner for failing to disclose seemingly irrelevant facts, such rights are
not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, do not merit protection under the
compelling interest/narrowly tailored standard.
With respect to the latter, it is undisputed that Dr. Wagner communicated the emergency
nature of P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS. The Jensens have not provided any evidence that Dr.
Wagner did not actually believe this to be true. Instead, they contend that Dr. Wagner convinced
Ms. Cunningham to forgo normal investigatory procedures by overstating the immediacy of
P.J.'s medical needs, telling her that P.J. would be dead within five days. The Jensens base this
assertion entirely on Mr. Anderson's deposition testimony. However, Mr. Anderson did not
testify that Dr. Wagner made this statement, but that someone told Ms. Cunningham that P.J.
would die within five days. Although Mr. Anderson agreed that it was likely the referring
doctors, he "never verified who . . . made the statement."92 More important, Mr. Anderson's
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testimony on this point is inadmissible hearsay and, therefore, must be disregarded.
Accordingly, the record merely shows that Dr. Wagner communicated his belief to Ms.
Cunningham that P.J. required immediate medical treatment to give him the best chance possible
of surviving Ewing's Sarcoma, as diagnosed by the pathologists at PCMC.
In summary, the Jensens ask the Court to find that Dr. Wagner violated their substantive
due process rights to familial association and to direct P.J.'s medical care based on unreasonable
inferences that stretch the record far beyond its actual content. This does not satisfy their burden
of establishing a violation of their constitutional rights.
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct in providing medical care for P.J. and
referring his case to DCFS after the Jensens would not consent to P.J.'s treatment were narrowly
tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in protecting children. The record demonstrates
that Dr. Wagner referred P.J.'s case to DCFS after the Jensens refused to consent to
chemotherapy treatment which Dr. Wagner reasonably believed was necessary to save P.J.'s life.
There were, perhaps, additional measures that Dr. Wagner could have taken that might have
avoided the need to involve DCFS. For example, he might have ordered the additional tests
despite his belief that they were unnecessary and would delay needed treatment. However, the
constitution does not place an affirmative duty on him to do so where he reasonably believed
PJ.'s life was in danger. To the extent the Jensens claim to the contrary, their substantive due
process rights are no longer within the boundaries of fundamental rights and, therefore, are only
entitled to protection under the shocks the conscience standard—which Dr. Wagner's conduct
does not do.
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds it important that any actual interference with
the Jensens' substantive due process rights was accomplished by referring the case to DCFS,
filing the Verified Petition, and presenting P.J.'s case to a neutral judge—not by simply
removing PJ. from his parents and forcing him to undergo chemotherapy. Indeed, the Jensens
received ample opportunities to present their side of the story to the Juvenile Court. They were
represented by counsel throughout the Juvenile Court proceedings. The Jensens correctly
contend that the Constitution would not permit interference with their substantive due process
rights by means of intentional misrepresentations to the Juvenile Court. However, as outlined
above, the Jensens have simply not submitted evidence from which the Court can conclude that
Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented the events and circumstances surrounding P.J.'s medical
care to either the Juvenile Court or others involved in P.J.'s case.
For these same reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Wagner's conduct did not unduly burden
the familial association rights of the Jensens and P.J. Dr. Wagner's decision to refer P.J. to
DCFS minimally infringed the Jensens' familial association rights, preserving ample opportunity
for the Jensens to present their interests to the Juvenile Court. Perhaps further discussion might
have led to a more amiable solution, but in light of the perceived need for immediate treatment, it
was entirely reasonable to submit P.J.'s medical situation to DCFS authorities. Again, the
Jensens are correct that intentional and material factual misrepresentations and omissions on the
part of Dr. Wagner to either DCFS representatives or the Juvenile Court would surely have
interfered with their associational rights on a much grander scale. However, the record simply
does not sustain these allegations. Accordingly, the Court will grant Dr. Wagner's Motion for
Summary Judgment with respect to the Jensens' substantive due process claims.
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Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their substantive due
process rights in two ways: (1) by failing to properly investigate P.J.'s referral; and (2) by
making deliberate factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court.
The Court finds that Ms. Cunningham did not violate the Jensens' constitutional rights by
failing to investigate the representations of Drs. Wagner and Corwin. The Jensens' claims have
important similarities to the Eighth Circuit case of Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc9A
The plaintiff in Thomason brought a substantive due process claim against a state social worker
for violation of her right to "the care, custody and management" of her infant child.95 The social
worker received a report from a doctor who was treating the plaintiffs child, including two
letters and an article from the Journal of Pediatrics, which stated his concern that the plaintiff
might be suffering from a psychological disorder that causes her to partially suffocate her child
in order to garner the attention of health care professionals.96 Without investigating the
allegations, the social worker removed the child from the plaintiffs custody and "arguably
mischaracterized" the doctor's report in an affidavit to the juvenile court.97 The Eighth Circuit
held that the social worker's failure to investigate did not violate the parent plaintiffs
constitutional rights where she relied on the doctor's "reasonable suspicion that life-threatening
abuse [was] occurring in the home."98
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Similar to the social worker in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham relied on the information
provided to her by P.J.'s treating physician in filing the Verified Petition. The Jensens have
produced no evidence that Ms. Cunningham had reason to suspect the information and opinions
given to her by Drs. Wagner and Corwin were misleading. Rather, the Jensens contend that if
Ms. Cunningham would have fulfilled her duties under Utah law to investigate P.J.'s referral, she
would have discovered the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made to her by the
doctors. However, any duty to investigate that Ms. Cunningham may have had under State law
cannot form the basis of a § 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process."
In this emergency situation, like the one in Thomason, Ms. Cunningham was reasonable
in relying on the information provided to her by the doctors, even in the absence of any further
investigation. Dr. Wagner communicated to Ms. Cunningham that P.J.'s situation was a medical
emergency and that P.J.'s life was in danger, thus implicating the State's compelling interest in
P.J.'s safety. The means used by Ms. Cunningham to address the State's compelling interest in
the emergency medical situation were narrowly tailored. Ms. Cunningham did not seek to
immediately remove P.J. from the home. Rather, she filed the Verified Petition, thus instituting a
state court proceeding where the Jensens would have an opportunity to rebut the doctor's
allegations. If the situation had been represented to Ms. Cunningham as something less than an
urgent medical emergency, perhaps a duty to investigate could be constitutionally required. Such
a duty may be needed in non-emergency situations in order to curb "overzealous suspicion and
intervention on the part of health care professionals and government officials," which "may have

"See Jones v. City and County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir. 1988)
("Section 1983 does not, however, provide a basis for redressing violations of state law, but only
for those violations of federal law done under color of state law.").
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the effect of discouraging parents and care takers from communicating with doctors or seeking
appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially life-threatening conditions."100
However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Ms. Cunningham did not reasonably
believe the doctors' contentions that PJ.'s life was in danger and immediate action was
necessary to ensure his welfare. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have not
established a constitutional violation of either their right to familial association or their right to
direct PJ.'s medical care with respect to Ms. Cunningham's actions in failing to investigate
PJ.'s referral and in filing the Verified Petition.
The Court also finds that the Jensens have not established a constitutional violation based
on Ms. Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court. As an
initial matter, the Court notes that the Jensens have failed in their opposition memorandum to
point out the specific factual misrepresentations and omissions on which they base their claim
against Ms. Cunningham. As the Jensens bear the burden of establishing a constitutional
violation of the their substantive due process rights, this failure alone entitles Ms. Cunningham to
qualified immunity.101
Nonetheless, having carefully reviewed their opposition memorandum, the Jensens
appear to base their substantive due process claims on three instances in which they contend Ms.
Cunningham made factual misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court: (1) the
Verified Petition; and (2) an August 8, 2003 affidavit; and (3) an August 18, 2003 affidavit. The
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Jensens have not brought forth any evidence that Ms. Cunningham knew that the information
contained in the Verified Petition was misleading or deficient. As outlined above, Ms.
Cunningham had no constitutional duty to investigate the information provided her by PCMC
doctors before filing it. Thus, Ms. Cunningham's statements in the Verified Petition do not
establish a violation of the Jensens' substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the Jensens'
substantive due process claims depend entirely on the misrepresentations and omissions
allegedly made by Ms. Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits.
Assuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the "misrepresentations and omissions" made
by Ms. Cunningham in her August 2003 affidavits do not establish a constitutional violation.
The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham made the following misrepresentations and omissions
in both her August 8 and August 18 affidavits: (1) stating that a sample of P.J.'s tumor was sent
to Dana-Farber for a second opinion without stating that the second opinion was never given; (2)
stating that P.J. underwent a CT and Bone Scan without stating that these tests were normal; (3)
stating that the Jensens wanted to use IPT to treat P.J. when they were actually no longer
interested; (4) omitting to state that the "controlling" genetic tests were not yet complete; (5)
omitting to state that she had not actually spoken with Dr. Coffin; (6) referring to Dr Birkmayer
as a man rather than as a doctor; and (7) stating that Dr. Tishler recommended in the July 28,
2003 hearing that P.J. should begin chemotherapy when Dr. Tishler had actually reserved his
final opinion until all the testing was complete.
Upon close inspection of the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham submitted her
August 2003 affidavits, the alleged misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any,
consequence. Of the alleged misrepresentations and omissions listed above, only numbers 4 and
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7 have any potential significance. However, the record clearly reveals that they cannot support
the Jensens' claims.
In the hearing held on July 28, 2003, the Juvenile Court clearly ordered that P.J. begin
chemotherapy by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not begin PJ.'s chemotherapy by that date.
Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits were submitted with the State's application to take
PJ. into protective custody as a result of the Jensens' failure to begin PJ.'s chemotherapy.
The hearing transcript shows that Dr. Tishler did in fact recommend that P.J. begin
chemotherapy at the July 28 hearing and that any burden to place further test results before the
Juvenile Court was on the Jensens. At the July 28 hearing, Mr. Nakamura clearly advocated the
Jensens' concern that some of the testing was not yet completed. Dr. Tishler indicated that there
was no question that P J. had a malignant tumor that would require chemotherapy and that the
remaining pathological and radiological tests would merely serve to clarify what type of tumor
he had. Upon hearing and accepting this, the Juvenile Court ordered that PJ.'s chemotherapy be
commenced before August 8, 2003, without regard to the test results. The Juvenile Court also
stated in the July 28 hearing that should the test results indicate that chemotherapy was not
needed, the Jensens were free to bring that to the court's attention. Thus, numbers 4 and 7 were
not misrepresentations or omissions at all, as demonstrated by the hearing transcript itself.
The other alleged misrepresentations and omissions were plainly immaterial. Numbers
one, two, and three are listed in Ms. Cunningham's August 18 affidavit as information provided
to her by Dr. Wagner around June 16, 2003. Although this information provided useful
background information, it was clearly not material to the issues before the Juvenile Court in
mid-August 2003. Those issues centered on the Jensens' failure to comply with the Juvenile
Court's order that P J. begin chemotherapy by August 8, 2003. With respect to number 5, Ms.
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Cunningham did not state that she spoke with Dr. Coffin. Rather, she merely states that
according to Dr. Coffin, the Jensens had Dr. Christensen do a second oral surgery on P.J.'s
mouth resulting in an additional sample that was sent to the University of Washington—a fact
that the parties do not dispute. Finally, and exemplary of the "misrepresentations and omissions"
the Jensens allege Ms. Cunningham made, Ms. Cunningham's reference to Dr. Birkmayer as a
man rather than a doctor was not material to the matters before the Juvenile Court at that time.
The Court finds that the misrepresentations and omissions allegedly made by Ms.
Cunningham were completely immaterial to the issues before the Juvenile Court and, therefore,
did not interfere with the Jensens' substantive due process rights, even under the compelling
interest/narrowly tailored standard.102 As outlined above, Ms. Cunningham instituted process
before a State court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim of medical neglect against
the Jensens. In this proceeding, the Jensens' fundamental rights to direct the custody, care, and
control of their son were carefully balanced by a neutral judge. There is simply insufficient
evidence that Ms. Cunningham deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the
Juvenile Court.
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens allege that Mr. Anderson violated their rights to familial
association and to direct P.J.'s medical care by (1) interfering with their ability to select their
doctors; (2) refusing to withdraw the Verified Petition; (3) intentionally failing to disclose
material facts to the Juvenile Court; and (4) failing to properly train and supervise DCFS case
workers. The Court finds the Jensens have not established that Mr. Anderson violated their
substantive due process rights.
102

Accordingly, the Court also finds that Ms. Cunningham's actions did not violate the
Jensens' substantive due process rights under the undue burden and shocks the conscience tests.
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First, the Jensens claim that Ms. Anderson violated their right to direct P.J.'s medical
care by insisting that the State select the doctor who would treat P.J. According to the Jensens, a
parent is entitled to choose the doctor who will provide medical treatment to their child as long
as the alternatives are reasonable. They contend that Mr. Anderson "took the position that the
State could force the parents to go to the court and let the court decide which physician was
'better,'"103 thus preventing the Jensens from placing P.J. under the care of either Dr. Birkmayer
or Dr. Simone.
The Court finds, based on the circumstances of the case, that this does not amount to a
constitutional violation of the Jensens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Mr. Anderson's
involvement with P.J.'s case did not begin until late August 2003. By this time, the Juvenile
Court had already held a number of hearings to determine the medical care that was in P.J.'s best
interest. To that end, the Juvenile Court ordered P.J. to begin chemotherapy administered by a
board-certified pediatric oncologist by August 8, 2003. The Jensens did not meet this deadline
and the Juvenile Court granted protective custody of P. J. to the State. It was at this point that Mr.
Anderson become involved in the case, attempting to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution. In
his negotiations, Mr. Anderson took the position that P.J. must be treated with chemotherapy by
a board-certified pediatric oncologist. This position was in accord with both the Juvenile Court's
order and the opinion of Dr. Tishler who had evaluated PJ. Most important, as even the Jensens'
acknowledge, Mr. Anderson's position was that if the Jensens wanted a different doctor, they
could make their request to the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court was readily available to hear
and determine whether the Jensens' desire to have a different doctor treat P.J. was in his best
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interest. In light of these undisputed facts—particularly the fact that the negotiations were
conducted during the course of the Juvenile Court proceedings, which provided ample
process—Mr. Anderson's "position" that having a board-certified pediatric oncologist treat P.J.
was in his best interest was narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in
protecting P.J. Accordingly, such does not amount to a constitutional violation.
The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their constitutional rights by refusing
to withdraw the medical neglect allegations despite his admission that the Jensens were not
neglectful parents. The Jensens base this assertion on their depositions, in which they testified
that during negotiations with Mr. Anderson in late August 2003, Mr. Anderson said, "I
understand you're a great parent. I can see that, but we can't let you go. We can't have it over.
It's gone too far."104 The Jensens ask the Court to infer from this that Mr. Anderson knew the
Jensens were not guilty of medical neglect but chose to maintain the Verified Petition anyway for
political reasons.
These statements do not establish a violation of the Jensens' substantive due process
rights. The negotiations between the Jensens and Mr. Anderson began in late August 2003, after
the Juvenile Court had already granted protective custody of P.J. to the State and ordered that he
undergo chemotherapy to treat the cancer that multiple medical professionals indicated he had.
Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho in an attempt to negotiate an amiable resolution with the Jensens.
The above statements were allegedly made during the course of these negotiations. Upon this
background of undisputed facts, the Court cannot reasonably infer from Mr. Anderson's alleged
statements that the medical neglect allegations were baseless, that Mr. Anderson knew it, and
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that he admitted as much to the Jensens. Mr. Anderson's attempt to negotiate a workable
solution to the out-of-hand situation in no way interfered with the Jensens' right to familial
association or their right to direct P.J.'s medical care.
The Jensens also allege that Mr. Anderson violated their substantive due process rights by
intentionally failing to inform the Juvenile Court of the following: (1) definitive testing had
never been performed on P.J.'s tissue; and (2) Dr. Johnston had materially breached his
agreement to refrain from rendering a diagnosis before completing the independent testing.
These allegations provide neither a factual nor legal basis to find that Mr. Anderson
violated the Jensens' substantive due process rights. With regard to first alleged omission, the
Jensens have not directed the Court to evidence that Mr. Anderson knew the Juvenile Court was
unaware of the possibility for genetic testing or that genetic tests were "definitive." Rather, they
cite to the deposition testimony of P.J.'s guardian ad litem in which she indicates that she was
unaware of the possibility for genetic testing until September 4, 2003. This does not show that
Mr. Anderson intentionally withheld information about genetic testing from the Juvenile Court.
Moreover, the Jensens repeatedly stated their desire for further testing during the Juvenile Court
proceedings.
With respect to the second alleged omission, the Jensens contend that Mr. Anderson was
aware that Dr. Johnston had determined to recommend chemotherapy before receiving the results
of the genetic tests in violation of the September 5, 2003 stipulation and that Mr. Anderson failed
to inform the Juvenile Court of this fact. Mr. Anderson testified that he understood Dr. Johnston
would perform an independent evaluation of P.J.'s medical condition, including independent
testing, before rendering a final treatment recommendation. Mr. Anderson also testified that he
was aware the genetic tests were not finished when Dr. Johnston determined to recommend
49

chemotherapy. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Anderson understood that rendering a
diagnosis before completion of the genetic testing breached the September 5 stipulation. The
deposition testimony cited by the Jensens only refers to "independent testing."105 There is no
indication in either Mr. Anderson's testimony, or in the written stipulation, that Dr. Johnston
could not have sufficiently confirmed the diagnosis through independent testing, like the
pathological testing conducted by Dr. Coffin, even though the genetic testing was not complete.
Moreover, there is no evidence showing that Mr. Anderson intentionally withheld the fact that
the genetic testing was incomplete from the Juvenile Court. The Court cannot find that Mr.
Anderson was deliberately withholding information from the Juvenile Court based merely on the
fact that he knew the genetic tests—which Dr. Johnston testified were immaterial to his treatment
recommendation—were not yet complete. Most important, the Jensens have failed to show how
Mr. Anderson's alleged failure to disclose this information interfered with their right to direct
PJ.'s medical care. The Jensens refused to follow Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations,
which lead to DCFS's decision to dismiss the case shortly thereafter. The only action taken by
the Juvenile Court subsequent to Dr. Johnston's recommendation was to dismiss the case.
Finally, the Jensens argue that Mr. Anderson should be liable for failure to adequately
train and supervise DCFS case workers. Presumably, although it is far than clear, the Jensens
claim that Mr. Anderson is liable for the injuries resulting from Ms. Cunningham's actions in
failing to properly investigate PJ.'s referral because he failed to train her. The Jensens cite to the
case of City of Canton v. Harris106 for the proposition that a supervisor who acts with deliberate
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indifference in failing to train and supervise subordinates is subject to liability under section
1983.
The Jensens' failure to train and supervise claim fails for two reasons. First, the Jensens
have not brought any evidence to the Court's attention that could show Mr. Anderson acted with
"deliberate indifference"107 to the rights of others in failing to train Ms. Cunningham. Second,
the Jensens have not established that Ms. Cunningham's conduct violated their constitutional
rights, a prerequisite to Mr. Anderson's liability for failure to train her.108
In sum, the Court finds that none of Mr. Anderson's actions during his involvement with
PJ.'s case interfered with the Jensens' substantive due process rights.
2. Procedural Due Process
The Jensens claim that each of the Defendants violated their procedural due process
rights. Ms. Cunningham, Ms. Eisenman, and Mr. Anderson present argument on these claims.
Dr. Wagner incorporates these arguments by reference. However, as Ms. Eisenman and Dr.
Albritton enjoy absolute immunity, the Jensens' procedural due process claims against them are
not discussed.
Ms. Cunningham. The Jensens claim that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural due
process rights by failing to properly investigate PJ.'s referral and by intentionally
misrepresenting facts to the Juvenile Court.
At its most basic level, due process ensures that a person may not be deprived of an
interest in life, liberty, or property without "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
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in a meaningful manner."

As noted by the Court in its June 2006 Decision, the Due Process

Clause also requires that "the notice and hearing . . . be fair."110 Accordingly, in considering the
Defendants' motions to dismiss in June 2006, the Court found that the Jensens' allegation that
"[Ms. Cunningham] intentionally misrepresented or omitted facts in the Jensens' case, including
the status of allegedly confirmatory tests, to the Utah juvenile court" was sufficient to state a
claim for violation of their rights to procedural due process.111
However, as set forth above, the Jensens have failed to submit evidence that Ms.
Cunningham deliberately made material misrepresentations and omissions to the Juvenile Court.
Rather, the Jensens merely nitpick Ms. Cunningham's August 2003 affidavits. These alleged
misstatements are not the type of intentional falsities that would render an otherwise procedurally
sound judicial proceeding "unfair."112 Rather, these misrepresentations, which dealt with facts
known to the Jensens, were more properly addressed by the Jensens' counsel at the August 8,
2003 hearing before the Juvenile Court. For example, the Jensens' counsel could, if desired,
easily have pointed out to the Juvenile Court that Dr. Birkmayer was more than just a "man."
Thus, the Jensens have not established a violation of their procedural due process rights with
regard to the alleged factual misrepresentations and omissions.
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110

Docket No. 52, at 23 ("[T]he Due Process Clause also encompasses . . . a guarantee of
fair procedure.") (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959) (finding due process violation
where witness gave perjured testimony that he had received no promise in return for his
testimony when in reality he had).
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Additionally, the Court finds that the Jensens' had no liberty interest in the investigation
of child abuse claims required of DCFS case workers under Utah law and, therefore, cannot
establish a violation of their procedural due process rights by virtue of Ms. Cunningham's failure
to carry out that investigation. "Protected liberty interests may arise from two sources—the Due
Process Clause itself and the laws of the States."113 A State may create a liberty interest "by
establishing substantive predicates to govern official decision-making . . . and by mandating the
outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met."114 Both of these
elements are necessary for the creation of a liberty interest. Thus, where state law requires the
fulfilment of specified substantive predicates but does not mandate a certain outcome, there is no
liberty interest.115
"State-created procedures . . . do not create such an entitlement where none would
otherwise exist."116 As stated by the Supreme Court: "Process is not an end in itself. Its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate
claim of entitlement."117 For example, in Pierce v. Delta County Department of Social Services,
the plaintiffs argued that Colorado's Child Protection Act created a liberty interest by mandating

n3

Ky. Dept. ofCorr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 462 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 464-465.
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Piercev. Delta County Dept. ofSoc. Servs., 119F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1152-53 (D. Colo.

2000).
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0//m v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
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that acts of child abuse be reported and properly investigated.118 The court rejected this
contention, finding that the Colorado statutes at issue merely mandated procedure without
dictating "a particular substantive outcome or guarantee."119
The Jensens contend that Utah law, by statue, imposes mandatory duties to perform
specific investigative actions before doing anything that might affect parental rights. Even
assuming that this is the case, the Jensens merely assert a liberty interest in process, not in
substantive outcomes. The Jensens do not point to any section of the Utah Code that sets forth a
specific substantive predicate that, when fulfilled, dictates a specific substantive outcome. This
does not create the sort of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. Cunningham violated their procedural
due process rights.
Mr. Anderson. The Jensens claim that Mr. Anderson implemented a policy whereby case
workers would not investigate allegations of medical neglect when made by doctors from PCMC
and that this policy violated their due process rights.120 The Jensens also claim that this policy
violated their right to equal protection. However, because they did not plead an equal protection
claim, and apparently asserted it for the first time in the summary judgment briefing, the Court
will not consider this argument.

m

Pierce, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
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Id.

120

At some point, the Jensens also claimed that Mr. Anderson made factual
misrepresentations and omissions to the state courts. However, the Jensens have not pursued this
theory in their summary judgment briefing and have submitted no evidence to support it.
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The Jensens have failed to submit any evidence that DCFS actually had a policy of not
investigating medical neglect allegations if they were made by PCMC doctors. Rather, the
Jensens ask the Court to infer that such a policy was instituted by Mr. Anderson based on the
following: (1) Ms. Cunningham did not investigate P.J.'s referral; (2) Ms. Cunningham testified
that she believed her actions were consistent with DCFS policy; and (3) Ms. Cunningham
testified that Mr. Anderson told her she handled P.J.'s case appropriately. This evidence is
simply not enough to show that DCFS had a policy of never investigating medical neglect
allegations made by PCMC doctors. Ms. Cunningham's alleged failure to investigate P.J.'s
referral took place in a situation that was represented to her by Dr. Wagner as a medical
emergency requiring prompt action. To the extent that her alleged failure to investigate did
represent DCFS policy, it merely shows that DCFS policy allowed case workers to file a custody
petition with a juvenile court of competent jurisdiction without further investigation when
presented with objectively reasonable allegations of emergency medical neglect made by a
doctor charged with the child's medical care. As explained in detail above, such a policy would
not violate a parent's rights under the Due Process Clause. Moreover, even if DCFS did have a
policy of never investigating referrals submitted by PCMC doctors, such a policy did not harm
the Jensens in P.J.'s emergency case. Thus, the Court finds the Jensens have failed to establish
that Mr. Anderson violated their procedural due process rights.
Dr. Wagner. As the Jensens received ample notice and an opportunity to be heard, any
procedural due process claims against Dr. Wagner must be based on his alleged
misrepresentations and omissions. However, as set forth above, the Jensens have not submitted
competent evidence that Dr. Wagner deliberately misrepresented or omitted material facts to the
Juvenile Court or others involved in the case. Moreover, any misrepresentations and omissions
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allegedly made by Dr. Wagner did not make the Juvenile Court proceedings unfair. The record
demonstrates that the Jensens received ample opportunity to present their desire for further
testing in the Juvenile Court. In fact, these desires were heard and decided upon by that court.
The Jensens have not established that Dr. Wagner violated their procedural due process rights.
3. Malicious Prosecution
In their third cause of action, the Jensens121 allege that each of the Defendants122 violated
their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures by instituting and
continuing a "malicious prosecution." Each of the Defendants has moved for summary judgment
on this claim. Notably, the Jensens have failed to respond to Mr. Anderson's motion on this
point. Accordingly, the Court will grant his motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment
claim.
Under Tenth Circuit law, analysis of a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is guided by the elements of the common law tort of
malicious prosecution.123 However, "the ultimate question in such a case is whether plaintiff has
proven the deprivation of a constitutional right."124 As recently stated by the Tenth Circuit in
Wilkins v. DeReyes,

121

As the Court dismissed P.J.'s Fourth Amendment claim in its June 2006 Order, Mr. and
Ms. Jensen proceed without him on this claim.
122

The Jensens' malicious prosecution claims against Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton are
not discussed in light of their absolute immunity.
m

Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 797 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Novitsky v. City of
Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Under our cases, a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes the
following elements: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiffs continued
confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the
plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued
confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the
plaintiff sustained damages.125
The Jensens seek damages for malicious prosecution arising from both the Juvenile Court
proceedings and the criminal case.
a. Juvenile Court Proceedings.
To establish a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, the
plaintiff must show that a seizure actually occurred.126 In Becker v. Kroll, the Tenth Circuit
considered a § 1983 plaintiffs claim that she was seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment even though she "was never arrested, incarcerated, or otherwise placed under the
direct physical control of the state."127 The plaintiff—who was charged with a felony offense in
a state court—argued that investigation into her alleged criminal activity "imposed burdens on
her time, finances, and reputation by requiring her to travel to and attend meetings, pay legal
costs, and eventually, face criminal charges" and, therefore, constituted a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.128 The court declined "to expand Fourth Amendment liability in cases
where the plaintiff has not been arrested or incarcerated."129 Specifically, the court noted that
were it to impose Fourth Amendment liability in cases that lacked a traditional seizure, "every
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Id. at 799.
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Id. at 915.
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charging decision would support a § 1983 malicious prosecution-type claim no matter the
context."130
It is undisputed that neither Mr. Jensen nor Ms. Jensen was arrested, incarcerated, or
otherwise placed under the direct physical control of the State as a result of the proceedings in
the Juvenile Court. Recognizing this, the Jensens argue that the Court should expand the Fourth
Amendment concept of "seizure" to accord with that proposed in Justice Ginsberg's concurrence
in Albright v. Oliver.131 The Jensens contend that they suffered "significant, ongoing
deprivations] of liberty as a result of the Juvenile Court proceedings," which constitute a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, as follows:
The Jensens were unable to return to the state of Utah (their home) without the
threat of arrest and removal of their child. They were unable to take their child for
an evaluation in Houston, and to other physicians of their choosing, because the
State forbid it. They were subjected to mandatory court appearances. They were
ordered to give up their passports. [Mr. Jensen] lost his job, and was exposed to
serious diminishment of other employment prospects, both because he was
terminated from his previous job, and because he had to devote his time, finances,
energy and efforts to attempting to protect his and his family's rights. The
Jensens were subjected to close media scrutiny and held up to public ridicule and
contempt. Finally, the Jensens endured the horrible financial and emotional strain
of defending their family from neglect proceedings that were based entirely upon
misrepresentations and deceit.132
Although acknowledging the burdens experienced by the Jensens in defending
themselves, the Court simply cannot find that they experienced a Fourth Amendment seizure as a
result of the Juvenile Court proceedings. Tenth Circuit precedent clearly mandates the contrary.

I31

510 U.S. 266 (1994).

132

DocketNo.342,atl5-16.
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Accordingly, the Court finds that the Jensens have failed to establish a Fourth Amendment
violation related to the Juvenile Court proceedings,
b. Criminal Case
With regard to the criminal case, the Defendants focus their challenges on the first and
third prongs above: causation and probable cause. Because it is clear that neither Dr. Wagner nor
Ms. Cunningham caused the prosecution of the criminal action against the Jensens, analysis of
probable cause is unnecessary.
In order to establish a constitutional violation, the Jensens must show that Dr. Wagner
and Ms. Cunningham "caused the plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecution."133 In
Pierce, the Tenth Circuit held that this element reaches more than just those who actually initiate
a criminal action.134 Surveying both the common law and cases interpreting the reach of the
Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that a forensic analyst who fabricated inculpatory
evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence, thereby leading prosecutors to indict and
prosecute" the plaintiff, sufficiently caused the plaintiffs continued prosecution for purposes of
the plaintiffs § 1983 claim, even though she did not formally initiate the charges.135 In each of
the examples used by the Pierce court to reach this conclusion, the state actor's conduct was
closely connected to either the initiation or continuation of the prosecution.136 Notably, the
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Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1291-92.
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Id. at 1291-94.
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Id. at 1292 ("[A] private person who takes an active part in continuing or procuring the
continuation of criminal proceedings initiated by himself or by another is subject to the same
liability for malicious prosecution as if he had initiated the proceedings.") (citing Restatement
(Second) Torts § 655); id. (citing Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655-56 (10th Cir. 1990)
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principles described by the Pierce court closely resemble the definition of a complaining witness
provided in Anthony v. Baker131 for purposes of determining the applicability of prosecutorial
immunity: "The term 'complaining witness' describes the person (or persons) who actively
instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff."138
The Court finds that Dr. Wagner did not cause the initiation or continued prosecution of
the criminal case. The Jensens' claims with regard to Dr. Wagner relate entirely to information
provided to DCFS, its representatives, Ms. Eisenman, and the Juvenile Court. In fact, Dr.
Wagner moved to Ohio in late June 2003 during the pendency of the Juvenile Court proceedings
and before any change in P.J.'s legal custody. Dr. Wagner's final involvement with the Juvenile
Court proceedings was his execution of an affidavit dated July 22, 2003, outlining basically the
same information provided previously to DCFS in his case summary. Dr. Wagner executed the
affidavit at Ms. Eisenman's request. The affidavit was to be used in connection with the Juvenile
Court proceedings. There is no evidence that Dr. Wagner ever had contact with anyone from the
District Attorney's Office. Initiation and continuation of the criminal case were dependant on
multiple intervening events, including, most notably, the Jensens failure to comply with the
Juvenile Court's orders. Thus, Dr. Wagner did not cause the initiation or continuation of the

(finding "sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the [defendant police officers] purposefully
concealed and misrepresented material facts to the district attorney which may have influenced
his decision to prosecute [the plaintiff]")); id. ("If police officers have been instrumental in the
plaintiffs continued confinement or prosecutions, they cannot escape liability by pointing to the
decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors, or magistrates to confine or prosecute him.") (quoting
Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988)).
137

955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1992).
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criminal case based solely on his referral of P.J.'s case to DCFS and his limited participation in
the Juvenile Court proceedings.
The Court likewise finds that Ms. Cunningham did not cause the initiation or continued
prosecution of the criminal case. The Jensens argue that Ms. Cunningham's participation in the
criminal case is shown by the fact that her name appears on the probable cause statement on
which the criminal charges were based and that Ms. Eisenman testified that Ms. Cunningham
provided information to Officer Peterson, who authored that statement. Even if this were true,139
it does not provide an evidentiary basis on which the Court could conclude that Ms. Cunningham
caused the prosecution of the criminal case. The Jensens do not indicate what information Ms.
Cunningham may have provided nor its relevance to the criminal charges—nor do they indicate
the circumstances in which Ms. Cunningham provided the information. Accordingly, the Court
finds the Jensens have failed to establish that Ms. Cunningham caused the initiation or
continuation of the criminal prosecution.
The Jensens argue that the Court should apply principles of concurrent causation to hold
all of the Defendants liable for the malicious prosecution. In the § 1983 context, "[w]here
multiple forces are actively operating . . . plaintiffs may demonstrate that each defendant is a
concurrent cause by showing that his or her conduct was a substantial factor in bringing [the
injury] about."140 Where concurrent causation is established, the burden of proof shifts to each
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In reality, the Court cannot assume Ms. Eisenman so testified because the deposition
pages cited by the Jensens were left out of their exhibits, despite receiving an opportunity to
supplement the record. See Docket No. 375 (ordering the Jensens to provide any materials
inadvertently omitted from their exhibits).
l40

Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Northington v. Marin,
102 F.3d 1564,1568-69 (10th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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defendant to prove that his conduct was not the cause of the harm.141 Should a defendant fail to
do so, he is liable for the whole injury under principles of joint and several liability.142
The Jensens have not shown that principles of concurrent causation should apply to their
Fourth Amendment claim. The Jensens have not submitted any evidence that Dr. Wagner or Ms.
Cunningham provided information to the District Attorney's Office or that their involvement in
the Juvenile Court case led to the initiation or continuation of the criminal charges. In fact, this
is not even consistent with the Jensens' version of the facts: "Eisenman was driving the criminal
charges effort, not McDonald or Cunningham."143 Accordingly, there is no evidentiary basis on
which to apply principles of concurrent causation and joint and several liability to the Jensens'
claim for malicious prosecution of the criminal case. Therefore, the Court finds that the Jensens
have not established that Dr. Wagner and Ms. Cunningham violated their Fourth Amendment
rights.
D. State Law Claims
The Court does not have original jurisdiction over any of the Jensens' state law claims.
As this Order disposes of all of the Jensens' federal claims, and as their Utah constitutional
claims present important questions of state law, the Court declines to further exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and will remand them to the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, from which this case was removed.144
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Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1),
(2); 1447(c).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant Richard Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket
No. 324], Defendant Kari Cunningham's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 326],
Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 329], and Defendants
Wagner and Albritton's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 332] are GRANTED IN
PART with respect to Claims 1, 2, and 3 of the Complaint. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant Susan Eisenman's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Consolidated
Statement of Fact [Docket No. 349], Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's Motion to Strike
References to P J.'s Current Condition [Docket No. 353], Defendants Wagner's and Albritton's
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Hearsay [Docket No. 356], and Defendant Wagner's and Albritton's
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Attempts to Rebut Medical Evidence Without Expert Testimony
[Docket No. 358] are DENIED AS MOOT. It is further
ORDERED that the Jensens' state law claims (Claims 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10) are
REMANDED to the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. It is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case forthwith.
DATED September 22, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

TED STEWART
Unilseraates District Judge
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